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A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE
COMPENSATION OF CRIME VICTIMS
IN THE LNITED STATES
DESMOND S. GREER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawmakers in the United States have enacted legislation provid-
ing for financial assistance to victims of crime since 1965, when the
California State Legislature enacted the first state program.1 The first
attempt to secure similar legislation on the federal level was also made
in 1965. However, that bill, like many subsequent proposals, failed to
secure the support of both Houses of Congress.2 By 1982, just over
two-thirds of the states had adopted compensation programs of one
kind or another, but Congress had still failed to pass legislation on
this matter.3 Eventually, the President's Task Force on Victims of
Crime reviewed the developments in the states and reached the fol-
lowing conclusion:
[S]ubstantial progress has been made by many states in their attempts to
compensate crime victims .... However, the states' inability to fully ad-
* Professor of Common Law, The Queen's University of Belfast. I wish to acknowledge
my gratitude to Dean Russell Osgood for providing the opportunity to undertake the re-
search for this Article while a Visiting Research Scholar at Cornell Law School in the Fall of
1992. I am also grateful to Mr. Jay Olson and Ms.Jackie McCann Cleland of the Office for
Victims of Crime in the Department ofJustice, and to Mr. Dan Eddy, Executive Director of
the National Association of Crime Victim Compensation Boards, for their invaluable assist-
ance. Thanks are also due to the National Victim Center and to the Law Library of George
Mason University Law School. But the responsibility for what follows, which attempts to
summarize the position in mid-1994, is mine alone.
1 1965 Cal. Stat. 1549. See also HERBERT EDELHERTZ & GILBERT GELS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC COMPENSATION TO VICTIMS OF CRIME 76 (1974); DANIEL McGILLIs &
PATRICIA SMITH, COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF CRIME: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN PROGRAMS 6-7
(1983).
2 For the early efforts to enact federal legislation, see EDELHERTZ & GEIS, supra note 1,
at 191-206. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved
a Uniform Crime Victims Reparations Act in 1973 [hereinafter 1973 UNIFORM Aar], which
"was enacted in five states, with four others adopting a substantially similar [A]ct." UNIF.
VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT 1992, Historical Notes, 11 U.LA. 375 (Supp. 1994). This has now
been superseded by the UNIF. VICIMs OF CRIME ACr 1992, art. 3, 11 U.L.A. 396 (Supp.
1994) [hereinafter 1992 UNIFORM ACr].
3 See McGILUs & SMITH, supra note 1, at 8, 31-32.
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dress the problems that persist suggest [sic] that there is an important
role for the federal government to play in this area.
4
Accordingly, the Task Force recommended that the United States
Congress "should enact legislation to provide federal funding to assist
state crime victim compensation programs" as part of a general strat-
egy to develop "comprehensive assistance to all victims of crime."
5
The prominence of the victims movement in the early 1980s secured a
favorable reception for this recommendation, and in 1984 Congress
enacted the Victims of Crime Acts (VOCA).6 VOCA established a fed-
eral office responsible for developing the rights of victims generally
and in particular for providing supplementary federal funding for
state victim assistance programs through a newly created Crime Vic-
tims Fund. VOCA support began in 1986 for compensation programs
which satisfied certain statutory requirements. 7 By 1992, as a result of
this initiative and the continuing concern for victims at the state level,
every state had enacted a compensation program. 8
The early stages of these developments were influenced by the
provisions of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme introduced
in Great Britain in 1964.9 That Scheme, too, has undergone a
4 PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 42-43 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT]. For a more detailed assessment, see generally McGILLIs &
SMITH, supra note 1.
5 TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 37. The Task Force argued: "[T] he fed-
eral government has made substantial sums of money available to states... for the educa-
tion and rehabilitation of state prisoners.... [I]t seems only just that the same federal
government not shrink from aiding the innocent taxpaying citizens victimized by those
very prisoners .... " Id. at 43-44. A federal compensation program was undesirable: "The
duplication of state and federal effort would not only be inefficient but also would be
confusing to the victims both entities seek to serve." Id. at 43. Much of the report was
concerned with the rights of victims in the criminal justice process.
6 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2170 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-10604
(1988 & Supp. 1993)).
7 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b) (1988).
8 The last states to enact programs were South Dakota in 1991, S.D. CODIFIED LAwS
ANN. §§ 23A to 28B-10 (1991) (current version at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-28B-1 to
44 (1994)) and Maine in 1992, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 316-A (West 1992) (as
amended by ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3360-3360(K) (West 1994)). Programs have been
in force for some time in the District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 3-401 to 446 (1994),
and the Virgin Islands, V.I. CODE ANN. tit 34, §§ 151-179 (1994), leaving Puerto Rico as the
sole exception. Except for Nevada's program, NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 217.220(1) (d)
(Michie 1992), all of the programs comply with the VOCA requirements. OFFICE FOR VIC-
TIMS OF CRIME, VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT OF 1984 AS AMENDED: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE CONGRESS at 3 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 VOCA REPORT].
9 The Scheme was promulgated under the royal prerogative, and not enacted as a
statute on account of its "experimental" nature. Note that it is a British Scheme, in that it
applies to England, Wales, and Scotland. Northern Ireland has had a separate statutory
scheme since 1968. For a commentary on the original British Scheme, see P.S. ATwAH, ACCI-
DENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAw 335-59 (3d ed. 1980) and DAVID R. MIERS, RESPONSES
TO VIcTIMISATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COMPENSATION FOR CRIMINAL VIOLENCE IN
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number of changes over the years-and indeed is currently facing its
most rigorous re-examination. 10 In both countries, therefore, the
original ideas and philosophies underlying the initial "experiment"
have been refined and developed in the light of almost thirty years of
experience.
The purpose of this article is to review the current compensation
programs in both the United States and Britain with reference to such
questions as: the extent of a victim's "right" to compensation; how the
concept of a victim has changed over the years; when victims become
disentitled to compensation or liable to have their compensation re-
duced; what is meant by "compensation," where the money comes
from, and the extent to which there is an "unmet need" for compensa-
tion. The expectation is that such an analysis will produce findings of
relevance for the future development of criminal injuries compensa-
tion in both jurisdictions.
II. THE "RIGHT" TO COMPENSATION
The British Scheme introduced in 1964 was-and still remains-
a constitutional and legal oddity. It is not embodied in legislation, 1
and it states only that the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board "will
GREAT BRITAIN AND ONTARIO passim (1978).
10 The current version of the scheme is the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme
1990 [hereinafter BRrrISH SCHEME]. Developments up to 1991 are summarized in D.S.
GREER, CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION. 1-10 (1991) and DAVID R. MIERS, COMPENSATION
FOR CRIMINAL INJURIES 1-11 (1990). The Scheme was put into statutory form by the Crimi-
nal Justice Act, 1988, ch. 33, §§ 108-117 (G.B.), but those provisions were not brought into
force. In December 1993, the Government announced that a radically amended (and sig-
nificantly less generous) extra-statutory "Tariff" Scheme would come into force in April
1994, and that the provisions of the 1988 Act "will accordingly be repealed when a suitable
legislative opportunity occurs." COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME: CHANGES TO
THE CRIM. INJURIES COMP. SCHEME, 1993, Cmnd. 2434, 1 38. This decision provoked wide-
spread opposition, leading (inter alia) to defeat of the Government in the House of Lords,
see 555 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1828-51 (16 June 1994), and to court proceedings
designed to have the decision quashed. In October 1994, the House of Commons, by a
narrow majority, "reversed" the House of Lords, see 248 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 445-77
(1994); but the next month the Court of Appeal held (by a majority of 2-1) that by intro-
ducing the "tariff scheme," the Home Secretary had acted unlawfully and in abuse of the
prerogative power. See Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex partle Fire Brigades
Union, 2 W.L.R. 1 (1995). The Home Secretary has been given leave to appeal to the
House of Lords. See Editorial, Fundamental Flaws in Compensation, 144 NEw L. J. 1577
(1994). Given this uncertainty over the new "Tariff' Scheme, reference hereafter will be to
the 1990 Scheme, unless otherwise indicated.
11 A major reason for the controversy over the new (non-statutory) "Tariff Scheme"
referred to in the previous paragraph is that it represents an attempt by the executive to
flout the will of Parliament as recorded in the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The majority of
the Court of Appeal in the Fire Brigades Union case held that the Home Secretary could not
lawfully exercise the prerogative power to establish a scheme radically different from the
provisions of the 1988 AcL
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entertain applications for ex gratia payments of compensation."1 2 In
theory, the state accepts no legal liability for criminal injuries suffered
by its citizens, 13 and the courts have described the Board as "a servant
of the Crown charged by the Crown, by executive instruction, with the
duty of distributing the bounty of the Crown." 14 In reality, the Board
members "are instructed and compelled to make payments to all who
come within the ambit of the Scheme. ' 15 Any failure to do so may be
challenged in the courts. 16 Thus, for all practical purposes, a crime
victim in Britain has a legally enforceable right to compensation.
The position in the United States does not appear to be so clear-
cut. Although compensation programs are invariably statutory, state
legislatures tend to accept that they have, at most, a "moral responsi-
bility" to assist crime victims. 17 The Florida program provides a typical
example:
The Legislature recognizes that many innocent persons suffer personal
injury or death as a direct result of adult and juvenile criminal acts or in
their efforts to prevent crime or apprehend persons committing or at-
tempting to commit adult and juvenile crimes. Such persons or their
dependents may thereby suffer disabilities, incur financial hardships or
become dependent upon public assistance. The Legislature finds and
determines that there is a need for government financial assistance for
such victims of adult and juvenile crime. Accordingly, it is the intent of
the Legislature that aid, care, and support be provided by the state, as a
matter of moral responsibility, for such victims of adult and juvenile
crime.18
12 BRITISH SCHEME, supra note 10, 1 4. For criticism of this "sophistry," see PETER CANE,
ATIYAH'S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAw 255 (5th ed. 1993). Cf. CriminalJustice
Act, 1988, ch. 33, § 111 (1) (G.B.) (providing only that an award "may be made" to persons
who qualify for compensation).
13 COMPENSATION FOR VIcTIMS OF CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, 1964, Cmnd. 2323, 1 8.
14 Regina v. Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. exparteLain, [1967] 2 Q.B. 864, 882 (perLord
Parker C.J.).
15 CRIMINAL INJURIES COMP. BD., FrST ANNUAL REPORT, 1965, Cmnd 2782, 5.
16 Lain, [1967] 2 Q.B. at 881-82. But cf., Regina v. Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd., exparte
P, [1994] 1 All E.R. 80, 84 (claim for compensation "not a right but a privilege").
17 "Very few states have adopted the rights theory as the basis of their compensation
scheme." Charlene L. Smith, Victim Compensation: Hard Questions and Suggested Remedies, 17
RUTGERS L.J. 51, 63 (1985). NewJersey is said to be an exception. But cf., White v. Violent
Crimes Comp. Bd., 388 A.2d 206 (N.J. 1978) (victim has no right to compensation). It
does not appear that the adoption of constitutional amendments declaring the "rights" of
crime victims has altered the position; the NewJersey Crime Victim's Bill of Rights is typi-
cal in stating only that a victim has a right to compensation "wherever possible." NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 52:4B-36 (West 1994). However, the victim may be given a right to be informed of
the existence of the compensation program as in Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-28-
3(9) (1993), or a right to restitution from a convicted offender as in California under CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 28(b) (Deering 1993) ("Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted
persons in every case . . . unless compelling and extraordinary reasons exist to the con-
trary."), or both.
18 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.02 (West 1994). See also MD. CODE ANN., Misc. GOV'T § 1
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Alternatively, legislation may declare that state assistance is "in the
public interest" or necessary "to promote the public welfare," or "a
stronger criminal justice system" or that it simply recognizes the need
of victims for indemnification. 19 However, legislators rarely, if ever,
argue that compensation legislation is necessary to meet the legal obli-
gation of the state or the legal entitlement of the victim. Generally,
compensation provisions give the Board discretion to compensate vic-
tims of crime. They state that a Board may pay compensation in ac-
cordance with the terms of the program20 or explain that "the Board
is not compelled to provide compensation in any case."21 The courts,
too, tend to come to the same conclusion, 22 though a different view is
occasionally expressed: "once a claimant. .. [has] met the statutory
qualifications set forth in [the Act] for an award[,] he possesse[s] a
sufficient 'personal right' and eligibility to the benefits.., and as an
aggrieved party [is] entitled to... judicial examination of the action
of the Board .... "23 Further, no case has been found in which a
(1993); W. VA. CODE § 14-2A-2 (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.001 (West 1993). See also Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 346.010 (Baldwin 1993) (compensation is payable "as a matter of grace")
and N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 620 (McKinney 1994) (same).
19 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13959 (Deering 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9001
(1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-2 (1994). For an interesting analysis of the nature of state
programs generally, see Susan K. Sarnoff, A National Survey of State Crime Victim Com-
pensation Programs, Policies and Administrative Methods 126-31 (unpublished Doctor of
Social Welfare thesis, Adelphi University).
20 See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 620 (McKinney 1994). Compare TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 56.34(a) (Vernon 1994) ("The attorney general shall award compensation.., if...
satisfied.., that the requirements of this [Act] are met.") with CAL. GOV'T CODE §13964(a)
& §13965(a) (Deering 1994) (where a victim comes within the terms of the program, the
board "shall" approve the application, but "may" authorize the payment of compensation).
21 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9005(3) (1992) ("The Board is not compelled to provide
compensation in any case.. . ."). See also HAw. REv. STAT. § 351-31(a) (1992) (The com-
mission "in its discretion ... may order the payment of compensation.... ."); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15B-25 (1993) ("[Act] shall not be construed to create a right to receive compensa-
tion"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 6363-29 (1993) ("Failure to grant an award does not create a
separate cause of action .... ).
22 See, e.g., Johnsen v. Nissman, 39 A.D.2d 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972); Lake v. State, 507
A.2d 1349 (RI. 1986); In re Saylor, 437 N.E.2d 321 (Ohio CL Cl. 1982); White v. Violent
Crimes Comp. Bd., 388 A.2d 206 (N.J. 1978). In Tennessee, compensation is "a matter of
legislative largesse." Williams v. State, No. 01-A-01-9206-BC-00212, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS
148, at *5 (Tenn. CL App. Feb. 19, 1993). In Ohio, it is the product of "a legislatively
created class gift." In re Schroepfer, 448 N.E.2d 528, 531 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1983).
23 Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 331 A.2d 55, 71 (Md. 1975). This is one of
only two American cases the writer has found referencing the British Scheme. The other is
Hersh v. Kentfield Builders, Inc., 172 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Mich. CL App. 1969). But see McCo-
mas v. Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd., 594 A.2d 583, 585 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1991) ("victims
of crime do not have a substantive right to the benefits created but only an expectation of
receiving those benefits"). Both views are said to be derived from the "welfare" nature of
the compensation program. See also Ellis v. N.C. Crime Victims Comp. Comm'n, 432
S.E.2d 160, 165 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (Board not given "complete discretion" as to the
making of an award).
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Board-or a court-has held that a person who satisfies the terms of a
program may properly be refused compensation. It would appear,
therefore, that American victims have, in practice, just as strong a
"right" to compensation as their British counterparts-with one ex-
ception: Many programs expressly provide that the payment of an
award is subject to the availability of funds; if sufficient funds are not
available, the Board is permitted-or indeed required-to make a re-
duced award, or no award at all.24 Such statutory provisions operate,
both in theory and in practice, as a significant derogation from what
may otherwise be a substantial, even if de facto, "right" to
compensation.
III. THE CONCEPT OF A VICrIM.
A. CITIZENSHIP AND RESIDENCE.
From the outset, the British Scheme has applied to any person,
irrespective of nationality, domicile, or length of residence, who sus-
tains a criminal injury in England, Wales, or Scotland or on board a
British vessel or aircraft. Coverage is not, however, provided for any
British citizen injured abroad.25 Similarly, in the United States, many
of the earlier state programs applied only to residents injured or
killed within the state. Coverage was not available for non-residents or
for residents injured or killed outside the state. One of the first re-
quirements of VOCA was the removal of any bar on the award of com-
pensation to non-residents injured or killed within the state, 26 and
Nevada is now the only state which fails to comply with this provi-
sion.2 7 Many programs, however, do not apply to prison inmates.
28
The citizenship of victims is generally irrelevant,29 but some uncer-
24 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-63-31(2) (1993) ("This program is not an entitlement
program. Awards may be limited or denied as determined appropriate by the board to
insure the viability of the fund."). See infra text accompanying notes 229 to 235.
25 BRrnSH SCHEME, supra note 10, 4; GREER, supra note 10, at 25-28.
26 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b) (4) (1988) (providing that a state program qualifies for VOCA
support if "such program, as to compensable crimes occurring within the State, makes
compensation awards to victims who are nonresidents of the State on the basis of the same
criteria used to make awards to victims who are residents of such State").
27 NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 217.220(1) (d) (Michie 1992) (victim must be resident of
Nevada). This provision makes Nevada the only program which fails to meet VOCA re-
quirements. See supra note 8. However, many state programs, such as Ky. Rxv. STAT. ANN.
§ 346.025(2) (Baldwin 1993), provide that non-residents are covered only while federal
funding is available.
28 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-7(c) (1994) (no compensation paid to a victim in-
jured while confined in any federal, state, county or municipal jail, prison, or other correc-
tional facility); MICH. ComP. LAws § 18.360(d) (1994) (same); Mo. REv. STAT. § 595.020(3)
(Vernon Supp. 1994) (same).
29 Non-U.S. residents are not eligible for compensation if injured in Arizona, ARIZ.
COMP. ADMIN. R. & REGS. R1O-4-103(3) (1990), Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-
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tainty remains with respect to non-citizens who have entered or re-
main in the United States unlawfully.
30
In 1988, a further VOCA provision required states to compensate
residents who were victims in another state which did not have a com-
pensation program. 1 With the enactment of programs in all states,
however, this provision has now lost most of its significance. Some
programs also provide coverage for residents injured outside the
United States-at least if they are injured in a jurisdiction which does
not have a compensation scheme.
3 2
7.3(c) (1990), or Texas, TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 56.32 (10) (A) (iii) (Vernon 1994).
Other programs have a reciprocity provision. Thus, a resident of a foreign country injured
in Ohio is only entitled to compensation if "the laws of [that country permit residents of
Ohio] to recover compensation as victims of offenses committed in that country." OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.51(A) (1) (a) (ii) (Baldwin 1990).
30 Occasionally, as in Arizona, the program expressly requires a claimant to be 'a lawful
resident of the United States." ARIZ. COMP. ADMIN. R. & REGS. R10-4-103(3) (1990). But
often it is enough if he or she is a "person," and in Hernandez v. Fahner, 481 N.E.2d 1004
(111. App. Ct. 1985), the court held that "the word 'person' meant all persons regardless of
immigration status or citizenship." Id. at 1011. An administrative policy of requiring proof
of immigration status was therefore held to be unauthorized. Id. at 1012. See also Cabral v.
State Bd. of Control, 169 Cal. Rptr. 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (compensation payable to
illegal immigrant injured in California).
31 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b) (6) (1988) imposes two conditions, that "(A) the crimes would
be compensable crimes had they occurred inside that State; and (B) the places the crimes
occurred in are States not having eligible crime victim compensation programs." Except
for Nevada and Puerto Rico, every state has an eligible crime victim compensation pro-
gram. Nevada has no "eligible" program, NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 217.220(1) (d) (Michie
1992), while Puerto Rico does not have any program. See supra note 8.
32 Coverage for residents injured abroad is included in the 1992 UNIFORM Acr, supra
,note 2, § 306(b), and a recent survey has established that some 24 programs have such a
provision, at least in cases where the foreign jurisdiction is without a similar program:
Research Notes, Coverage in Foreign Countries, CRIME VICTIM COMP. Q., No. 3, 1993, at 8. See,
e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-63-14(5) (1993); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 949.035(1) (West Supp.
1993); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 13:75-1.6(f)(2) (1993). In NewJersey, where compensa-
tion is payable to a resident injured abroad if: (a) the foreign jurisdiction is without a
victim compensation program, or (b) compensation is payable but does not "fully compen-
sate" the victim for all expenses, compensation was awarded (under (b)) to the widow of a
New Jersey resident killed when a terrorist bomb exploded on Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie Scotland. N.J. VIOLENT CRIMES COMP. BD., ANNUAL REPORT 1989-1990, at 14-15
(1991). The British Board made its first "sizeable" payment of compensation to a widow in
June 1994. Pan Am Widow Wins £32,270, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 29, 1994, at 4. Many
programs, however, still have a provision such as ALA. CODE § 15-23-3(2) (b) (Supp. 1994)
and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.53(lb) (West Supp. 1994) (out-of-state coverage applies only
where the injury is sustained in any state, territory, or United States possession).
1994]
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B. THE COMPENSATING EVENT.
1. A Crime of Violence.
(a) Generally.
From the outset, the British Scheme operated on the basis that
the principle of public compensation could 'Justifiably" be restricted
to victims of crimes of violence. 33 Similarly, compensation under
VOCA is payable to victims of "criminal violence. '34 Indeed, much of
the justification for public compensation of crime victims in both
countries derives from the concept of "violent" crime. That concept
has a seemingly clear core meaning, but is one which, in practice, has
led to some definitional difficulties. One obvious approach is to stipu-
late a list of "violent" crimes, as in NewJersey, where compensation is




3. threats to do bodily harm;
4. lewd, indecent, or obscene acts;





10. any other crime involving violence, including domestic violence.;
11. burglary;
12. tampering with a cosmetic, drug or food product.
35
Such stipulative definitions are designed to reduce problems of inter-
pretation and application. But they are open to the objection that
"[t] his practice could result in denial of benefits to some deserving
victims simply because legislatures failed to amend victim compensa-
tion laws to reflect new or changing offense definitions in their crimi-
nal codes." 36 The New Jersey program seeks to avoid this danger by
including "any other crime involving violence." But does that phrase
mean "any other crime" which "by its nature involves violence" or "any
other crime which in the particular case involves violence?" The New
33 COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, 1961, Cmnd. 1406, at iv.
34 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b) (1) (1988). The statute also requires a victim of a federal crime
to be compensated on the same basis as the victim of a state crime. 42 U.S.C.
§ 10602(b)(5) (1988).
35 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-1 1(b) (West Supp. 1994) (subsection (c) adds DUI offenses).
See also ALASKA STAT. §18.67.101 (1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-401(3)(A) (1994); 740 ILCS
45/2(c) (Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3360(3) (West Supp. 1993); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 949.03(1) (b) (West Supp. 1993).
36 DALE G. PARENT ET AL., COMPENSATING CRIME VIGTIMS: A SUMMARY OF POLICIES AND
PRACTICES 20 (1992) [hereinafter NIJ SUMMARY].
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Jersey Superior Court has adopted the first-and narrower-of these
possible interpretations:
Is arson a crime of violence under the Criminal Injuries Compensation
Act? We hold that because arson carries an inherent risk of causing bod-
ily injury to occupants, rescuers, and persons seeking to extinguish a
fire, it may be considered a crime of violence. . . where a claimant is in
fact injured by reason of an arson-caused fire.
37
But many programs prefer a broader and more pragmatic approach. 38
In addition, a list system may tempt legislatures to add specific
offenses in response to special pleading-as may have been the case in
NewJersey with reference to "tampering with a ... product." In Great
Britain, where railway suicides have led to train drivers suffering ner-
vous shock, the Scheme was amended in 1990 to include injuries suf-
fered as a result of "an offence of trespass on a railway."39
In general, however, while the British Scheme provides that com-
pensation is payable for any injury directly attributable to "a crime of
violence (including arson and poisoning)," 40 it does not list specific
offenses. Many programs in the United States use similar language.
However, a descriptive phrase such as "crime of violence" or "crimi-
nally injurious conduct" is open to different interpretations. Thus,
compensation may be payable with respect to:
[C]onduct that; (1) occurs or is attempted in this State, (2) poses a sub-
stantial threat of personal injury or death, and (3) is punishable by fine,
imprisonment, or death, or would be so punishable but for the fact that
the person engaging in the conduct lacked capacity to commit the crime
under the laws of this state. 41
The Massachusetts Program offers a variation on this approach:
[A] n act... which.., would constitute a crime; provided.., that such
act involves the application of force or violence or the threat of violence
by the offender upon the victim. 4 2
37 Puntasecca v. Violent Grimes Comp. Bd., 519 A.2d 890, 892 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1986).
Arson resulting in bodily injury is explicitly covered by some programs. See, e.g., N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-22-8(A)(1) & (2) (Michie Supp. 1994).
38 See infra text accompanying notes 45 to 48.
39 BRriSH SCHEME, supra note 10, 1 4(c). For the background, see GREER, supra note
10, at 52 and infra text accompanying notes 43 to 44. Oregon provides another macabre
example-"abuse of a corpse in any degree." OR. REv. STAT. § 147.005(4) (1993).
40 BRrTSH SCHEME, supra note 10, 4(a). Cf. Criminal Justice Act 1988, ch. 33,
§ 109(1) (a) & (3) (Eng.) (Act would have substituted a combination of a general test and a
list of specific offenses).
41 This formula, recommended in the 1973 UNirORM Acr, supra note 2, § 1(e), was
adopted in OHro REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.51(C) (1) (Baldwin 1990). See also MInN. STAT.
ANN. § 611A.52 (6) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); TEX. CraM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 56.32(4)
(West Supp. 1994). The 1992 UNIFORM Acr, supra note 2, § 304 refers simply to "a crime
[of violence, including drunk driving and domestic abuse]." (brackets in original).
42 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258A, § 1 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); see, e.g., Marshall v.
Commonwealth, 602 N.E.2d 204 (Mass. 1992) (in the absence of wanton or reckless con-
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Such definitions suggest that compensation is restricted to inherently
violent crimes; injury or death resulting from a crime does not per se
suffice. As the English Court of Appeal held in relation to the British
Scheme, "[W] hat matters is the nature of the crime, not its likely [or
actual] consequences. ' 43 As a result, neither a train driver who suf-
fered nervous shock from witnessing a person commit suicide by
throwing himself in front of a train, nor a police officer who was in-
jured as a result of criminal damage to property, received
compensation.
44
Such problems of interpretation tend to be avoided by a more
pragmatic-and more generous-approach which focuses not on the
nature of the crime, but on its consequence. Under this approach,
compensation is payable where any crime 45 (as defined in the state's
Criminal Code or in federal legislation) in fact results in personal in-
jury or death. 46 This was the method originally adopted in Great Brit-
ain, but it was rejected in 1969 because it gave the Scheme an
application-or at least a potential application-which went beyond
its intended scope.47 State programs which have adopted this ap-
proach are open to similar interpretation, but, as yet, this issue has not
arisen in practice or caused legislative concern.
48
duct by another, no crime of violence where V dies of self-inflicted drug overdose). The
proviso ceases to apply in 1995. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 258C, § 1 (West Supp.
1994). Missouri has a similar provision. Mo. REv. STAT. § 595.010.1(1) (Vernon Supp.
1994).
43 Regina v. Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd., exparte Webb [1987] Q.B. 74, 79 (perLawton
LJ.).
44 See id.; Regina v. Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd., ex pare Clowes [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1353.
45 Compensation may be limited to the victims of felonies. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 21-M:8-h(I) (West Supp. 1993) (adding DUI victims). Other apparently limiting
formulae probably do not help to interpret when a crime is compensable. For example,
the Colorado program offers compensation for an "intentional, knowing, reckless, or crim-
inally negligent act." COLO. REv. STAT. § 24.4.1-102(4) (1988). But what is one to make of
the Delaware approach which provides compensation for "any specific offense ... if the
offense ... contains the characteristics of murder, rape .... ." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 9002(3) (1987 & Supp. 1993). See also Keddie v. Delaware Violent Crimes Comp. Bd.,
1991 WL 215655 (Del. Super. Ct.) (holding that "promoting suicide" or assisting a person
to commit suicide is a compensable crime).
46 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.03(3) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-
15-2(3) (1990 & Supp. 1994) (referring to any crime which results in "physical injury, fi-
nancial hardship or death to the victim"); Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 949.01(1) (West 1982).
47 "[A] breach of the Factory Acts is a criminal offence and the Scheme was plainly
never intended to permit an application to the Board [in respect of an injury caused by
such an offence] ... " CRIMINAL INJURIES COMp. BD., SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, 1970, Cmnd.
4494, 7.
48 But see Ruppert v. Commonwealth Crime Victims Comp. Bd., 565 A.2d 221 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1989), appeal denied 578 A.2d 932 (1990). In Ruppert, the victim, injured in an
accident at work, claimed compensation on the basis that his employer's failure to obtain
workers' compensation insurance was a crime. Even though the court acknowledged that
failure to obtain workers' compensation insurance is a crime, it refused compensation be-
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However legislators define "crime of violence," most criminal in-
juries compensation in the United States and in Great Britain is paid
to victims of crimes which are undeniably "violent. '49 Although pre-
cise comparison is impossible due to the use of different (and some-
times unclear) classifications, Table 1 gives some impression of the
general pattern in six United States programs:
Table 1: INCIDENCE OF COMPENSATION CLAIMS RECEIVED BY CRIME
CATEGORY (%)50
CALIF MINN NY TEXAS OTHER ALL
Murder/Homicide 14.6 9.1 10.6 9.2 9 9.1
Robbery 6.3 2.2 n/a 7.0 n/a n/a
Assault 24.1 53.9 84.1 49.0 50.0 39.9
Rape/Sexual assault 7.0 5.9 4.9 8 7.5
Child molest/abuse 31.8 17.6 3.7 14.7 23 21.0
Domestic violence n/a 2.2 n/a 4 3.1
DUI 3.3 4.7 1.6 3.3 3 2.5
Hit-and-run 3.3 n/a 3.1 n/a n/a
Other 9.5 4.4 8.83 16.9
Two specific offenses which, largely as a result of "grassroots" pressure,
have given rise to special consideration in the United States are
drunken driving and domestic violence.
(b) Drunken Driving.
An injury attributable to a "traffic offense" was never compensa-
ble under the British Scheme, unless it was due to "a deliberate at-
tempt to run the victim down." 51 Prior to 1988, most programs in the
cause the victim's injury was not a "direct" result of that crime. Id.
49 Compensation is payable irrespective of whether the offender is apprehended, prose-
cuted, or convicted, provided that the victim proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that the offense was committed. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3360-F(3) (West
Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-63-11 (1993); Anne B. v. State Bd. of Control, 165 Cal.
App. 3d 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). A criminal act is an offense for compensation purposes
even if the offender lacked legal capacity to commit it by reason of insanity, intoxication,
infancy, etc. Compensation proceedings may be suspended if a prosecution is pending or
imminent. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.080(d) (1992). A conviction may be conclusive
proof of the commission of a crime. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §61 1A.52 (6) (b) (West
1987 & Supp. 1994).
50 See CAL. STATE BD. OF CONTROL, BIENNIAL REPORT 1990-1992, at 30 (1993); MINN.
CRIME ViaIMs REPARATIONS BD., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1994); N.Y. STATE CRIME VIarIMS
BD., ANNUAL REPORT 1990-1991, at 22 (1992); OFFImCE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, TEX.
CRIME VICTIMS Comp. ANNUAL REPORT 1993, at 16 (1994). "All" refers to a "nationvide
analysis" of claims statistics for 1993 compiled by the Office for Victims of Crime (copy on
file). '"Other refers to a survey of seven states in Note, Percentage of Claims Received (or Paid)
by Type of Crime, CRIME VicmM Comp. Q., No. 2, 1994, at 12. Note that it is not always clear
whether "murder" includes other homicides, and whether "domestic violence" includes
child abuse cases. The British Board does not give this information in its Annual Reports.
51 BRITISH SCHEME, supra note 10, 11. See GREER, supra note 10, at 46-48.
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United States similarly excluded compensation for injuries "arising
out- of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle except
when intended to cause personal injury or death. '52 Two reasons
were normally adduced: First, legislatures did not intend public com-
pensation to cover "accidental" injuries, and second, the existence of
motor vehicle insurance-and of uninsured motorist coverage
schemes-meant that road accident victims would usually be compen-
sated, regardless of impecunious defendants. Similar arguments pre-
vailed in Great Britain. In 1988, however, Congress amended VOCA
to provide that "compensable crime" includes "driving while intoxi-
cated" (DUI) .5 As a result, and unlike the position in Great Britain,
DUI injuries or deaths are now compensable in all programs. A typi-
cal provision is that found in Minnesota:
'Crime' does not include an act involving the operation of a motor vehi-
cle, aircraft, or watercraft that results in injury or death, except that a
crime includes any of the following:
(1) injury or death intentionally inflicted through the use of a motor
vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft;
(2) injury or death caused by a driver in violation of [drunk driving
laws] . . .; and
(3) injury or death caused by a driver of a motor vehicle in the immedi-
ate act of fleeing the scene of a crime in which the driver knowingly
and willingly participated.
5 4
In addition, many programs have been extended to include injuries
caused by "hit-and-run" drivers5 5 and reckless driving.56 But there
have also been attempts to limit the effect of such provisions. Victims
are reminded that they have the burden of proving, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the driver of the vehicle was intoxicated.
57
52 As recommended by the 1973 UNIFORM Acr, supra note 2, § 1(e). See, e.g., McGILLIS
& SMITH, supra note 1, 4.1.3 (1983); DEBORAH CARROW, CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION
PROGRAM MODEL 37-38 (1980).
53 42 U.S.C. § 10602(d)(3) (1988).
54 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.52(6) (c) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T.
CODE § 13960(c) (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); OHIO REv. CODE. ANN. § 2743.51(C) (1)
(Baldwin 1990).
55 Note, Coverage of Hit and Run as Compensable Crime, CRIME VICrIMs COMP. Q., No. 3,
1993, at 8 (reporting that 25 of 44 responding states cover victims of hit and run violations
with no specific indication of drunk driving). The 1992 UNIFORM ACT, supra note 2,
§ 304(1), however, is limited to DUI offenses.
56 SeeNAT'L ASS'N OF CRIME VICTIM COMP. BDS., PROGRAM HANDBOOK 11-1 (1992) [here-
inafter CVCB HANDBOOK]. Missouri seems to be unusual in providing compensation for
"vehicular manslaughter" even if the driver was not intoxicated. Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 595.010.1(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
57 See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 13:75-1.7(i)(1) (1993) (not necessary that of-
fender be convicted of offense, but victim "must demonstrate by a preponderance of the
credible evidence that the incident involved driving under the influence of alcohol or
drugs").
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Indiana sets out road traffic offenses that are not covered:
(A) A crime... resulting from the operation of a vehicle other than a
motor vehicle.
(B) Involuntary manslaughter resulting from the operation of a motor
vehicle by a person who was not intoxicated.
(C) Reckless homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle
by a person who was not intoxicated.
(D) Criminal recklessness involving the use of a motor vehicle, unless
the offense was intentional or the person using the motor vehicle was
intoxicated.58
Other programs adopt exclusionary rules based loosely on the con-
cept of "contributory misconduct." For example, some states refuse to
compensate victims who were also drunk drivers, who were passengers
in the offender's vehicle and either knew or ought to have known of
the condition of the driver, or who were not wearing a seat-belt. 59
Such provisions reflect a concern that the inclusion of drunk driv-
ing and other automobile accident cases will lead to many new claims
being made on budgets that are already overstretched. However,
there is little evidence that this is happening. In 1989, a survey of five
programs found that drunk driving accounted for only two to four
percent of claims filed.
60
Table 1 suggests that the picture has not changed a great deal
since 1989.61 Nonetheless, such cases tend to give rise to more serious
injuries, so that "average awards in DUI cases are more than twice the
average award for all other claims.162 In addition:
Program staff believe drunk driving cases take more time to process than
58 IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.1-8(1) (Bums 1994).
59 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1809(B) (4) (West 1982 & Supp. 1994); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 26A, § 12(e)(2) (Supp. 1992); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. 603.03(f) (1992); NJ. AD-
MIN. CODE tit. 13, § 13.75-1.7(i) (2) (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.08(2) (e) (West Supp.
1993). See also infra text accompanying note 170.
60 NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 4. See also CVCB Handbook, supra note 56, at XV-1
("experience ... would suggest that... relatively few claims.., are filed [because of] the
availability of collateral resources, such as... automobile insurance, uninsured motorists
funds, medical insurance and life insurance.").
61 See PA. CRIME VICTIM'S COMp. BD., ANNUAL REPORT 1992-1993, at 26 (1993) (report-
ing that DUI accounted for only 16 out of 1669 claims paid in 1992-1993); Div. OF VICTIM
SERVICES AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS, ANNUAL REPORT 1992-1993, at 18 (1994) (re-
porting that, in Florida, 4.7% of awards in 1992-1993 were made to DUI victims).
62 NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 20. More recent experience may be less pronounced.
For example, in California, DUI injuries represented 3.3% of claims received and 4.5% of
dollars paid in 1991-1992. CAL. ST. BD. Or CONTROL, BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 30.
The comparable figures for Texas were 3.3% and 4.2% respectively. TEX. CRIME VICTIMS
COmP., ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 16, 18. In Minnesota, 5% of claims and 7% of
payments arose from DUI cases. MINN. CRIME VICTIMS REPARATIONS BD., ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 50, at 6, 10. Figures produced by the Office for Victims of Crime (on file)
suggest that payments in DUI claims in 1993 averaged $3741 nationwide, as compared with
the overall average payment of $2084.
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other cases and note that dealing with two insurance companies and
numerous attorneys-as is the norm in these cases-greatly increases
the length of time from filing to payment.
63
It seems likely, however, that such problems are being ameliorated as
programs become more familiar with DUI claims. The net result is
that this initiative, despite some concerns, is being successfully incor-
porated into the state programs.
(c) Domestic Violence
Prior to 1979, the British Scheme did not allow compensation for
most injuries arising from domestic violence. 64 Once again, a similar
exclusion also operated in the United States. Boards in the United
States, however, sometimes granted an award when "the interests of
justice so require [d] ."65 The rationale for this exclusion is familiar to
a British observer:
The victims of a large percentage of crimes are relatives by blood or
marriage of the offender or his accomplice, or live in the same house-
hold with him. The award of [compensation] in these cases involves
serious questions of policy. Among those questions are the cost of the
program, the possibility of fraud and collusion, and other social judg-
ments. [Permitting a Board to refuse compensation where the award
would unjustly benefit the offender or his accomplice] may or may not
alone provide adequate protection.
66
In 1978, because of growing public concern about domestic assaults
on women and children, it became accepted in Great Britain that a
general "domestic violence" exception could cause injustice. The
British Scheme was accordingly amended to allow claims by such vic-
tims, but with certain requirements. 67 Shortly thereafter, a similar de-
63 NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 21.
64 See generally GREER, supra note 10, at 84-93; MIERS, supra note 10, at 153-56. This
remains the law for injuries sustained before 1979. See Regina v. Criminal Injuries Comp.
Bd., exparte P [1994] 1 All E.R. 80 (compensation not payable for child sex abuse by stepfa-
ther committed before Scheme amended in 1979); an appeal to the Court of Appeal has
been dismissed. THE INDEPENDENT, May 12, 1993.
65 This was the case in Kansas and Minnesota. See CARROW, supra note 52, at 4243;
McGILLs & SMITH, supra note 1, at 64-65.
66 1973 UNIFORM ACT, supra note 2, § 5(c), comment. See, e.g., Hollis v. State, 468
N.E.2d 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Weisinger v. Van Rennselaer, 362 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1974).
Compare CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1992, at 149 (1994) ("Family vio-
lence [against persons aged 12 or older] accounted for 7% of all violent crimes... 53% of
the ... violent crimes occurring between relatives involved the spouse or the ex-spouse of
the victim.").
67 BRITISH SCHEME, supra note 10, 8. In the case of adult victims, compensation is
payable only where the offender has been prosecuted (or there are good reasons why a
prosecution has not been brought), the offender and victim no longer live together in the
same household, and the Board are satisfied that the offender will not benefit from any
award. A child victim of domestic violence does not have to satisfy the living apart require-
ment, but he or she may be refused compensation where an award would be "against the
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velopment occurred in the United States. In 1982, the President's
Task Force on Victims of Crime commented that:
The states' desire to minimize fraud is laudable; however, many inno-
cent victims of violence in the home are being unfairly ignored. Some
states have successfully experimented with allowing flexibility in this area
as long as the award will not unjustly benefit the offender. A blanket
exclusion may be particularly devastating to child victims of intra-family
abuse who, as a result, are denied adequate treatment.68
Two years later, the Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence
also concluded that "this blanket exclusion [of victims of domestic vio-
lence] is unwarranted and blatantly unfair."69 Not surprisingly, in
1988 congress amended VOCA. Federal support would now be given
only to state programs that do
not, except pursuant to rules issued by the program to prevent unjust
enrichment of the offender, deny compensation to any victim because of
that victim's familial relationship to the offender, or because of the shar-
ing of a residence by the victim and the offender .... 70
Accordingly, the states amended their programs to this effect.71 Some
even require unjust enrichment to be "substantial," as opposed to
"minimal" or "inconsequential."72 But a concern lingered over the
necessity of further safeguards, like those in the British Scheme, to
prevent possible abuse. Some programs, for example, contained pro-
visions like the following:
Except in the case of rape, a member of the family of the offender or a
person maintaining sexual relations with the offender shall not be eligi-
ble to receive compensation for injuries sustained in an alleged crime
committed by the offender unless:
minor's interest." See generally GREER, supra note 10, at 84-93.
68 TASK FORCE FNAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 41.
69 Id. at 53.
70 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b) (7) (1988). Note that rules relating to unjust enrichment apply
to all claims, but in practice have greatest significance in domestic violence claims. Pro-
gram guidelines issued by the Department ofJustice in 1990 list four factors which states
should consider in developing rules governing domestic violence claims and stress that
"such rules cannot have the effect of denying most domestic violence victims of compensa-
tion." 55(2) FED. REG. 3180, 3184 (1990).
71 See, e.g., the Florida program was amended in 1990 to comply with VOGA. FL. Div.
OF VICTIM SERVICES, ANNUAL REPORT 1990-1991, at 15 (1992). Some programs now ex-
pressly cover injuries arising from the crime of "domestic violence." See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:4B-11 (b) (West Supp. 1994); see supra text accompanying note 35.
72 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-211(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994) ("No com-
pensation shall be awarded if... the offender is unjustly enriched by the award, provided
compensation ... which would benefit the offender in a minimal or inconsequential man-
ner shall not be considered unjust enrichment.... ."). N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13 § 13.75-
1.6(c) (1992) lists eight factors to be considered in determining whether unjust enrich-
ment is "substantial." Compare the National Association of Crime Victim Compensation




(1) such compensation would be in the interests of justice;
(2) such compensation would not unjustly benefit the offender; and,
(3) the claimant verifies... that [he] has cooperated with law enforce-
ment or the prosecution of the crime . . . or ... demonstrates to the
court that he possesses or possessed a reasonable excuse for failing to
cooperate.
7 3
Another cautious approach can be found in Missouri, where the
Board awards compensation "only if [it] can reasonably determine
[that] the offender will receive no substantial economic benefit or un-
just enrichment from the compensation. ' 74 By way of contrast, a
more constructive provision is found in New York:
[If] the Board determines... that the person criminally responsible will
receive substantial economic benefit or unjust enrichment from the
compensation ... the award may be reduced or structured in such way as
to remove the substantial economic benefit or unjust enrichment to
such person or the claim may be denied.
75
Because of these requirements, the number of adult domestic violence
claims, though increasing, has remained relatively low:
In Fiscal Year 1990, the states awarded roughly $2.2 million to slightly
over 1600 domestic violence victims. By the close of Fiscal Year 1992, the
number of claims awarded to domestic violence victims increased by
1005 and payments increased by nearly $1.5 million.76
It may be that victims of domestic violence often do not report the
crime, or if they do, they do not then cooperate in investigations. And
both steps are required for a successful claim.
On the other hand, child molestation or abuse has become a ma-
jor source of compensation claims in some states. In California, such
claims represented 7.0% of all claims made in 1983-1984. In 1991-
1992 (as indicated in Table 1) this figure rose to 31.8% of claims and
27.2% of payments. The California State Board of Control com-
73 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258A, § 3 (Law. Co-op. 1992). The Massachusetts legisla-
ture has repealed conditions (1) and (3) effective 1995. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258C,
§ 2(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
74 Mo. REV. STAT. § 595.020.2 (Vernon 1994) (emphasis added). N.H. CODE ADMIN. R.
Jus. r. 606.01 (1993) and Wvo. STAT. § 1-40-106(b) (i) (Supp. 1993) are similar.
75 N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 624(2) (McKinney Supp. 1994). Cf V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 34,
§ 164(d) (1992). Under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.3(b) (Supp. 1993), the Attorney
General may sue the offender or the victim or both to recover the award if the offender at
any time benefits from it.
76 1994 VOCA REPORT, supra note 8, at 16. Information provided by the Office for
Victims of Crime (on file) suggests that in 1993 the number of claims rose to 5055 (or
3.1% of all claims), and that 3469 claims totalling $4.9 million were paid. There may,
however, be some under-reporting in all these estimates, given that domestic violence re-
suIting in death may be classified as "homicide" rather than "domestic violence." For an
assessment of the scope of such violence, see L.ucy N. Freedman & Minna Shulman, Domes-
tic Violence-The Criminal Justice Response, in VIcrIMs OF CRIME: PROBLEMS, POLICIES AND PRO-
CRAMS 27, 87 (ArthurJ. Lurigio et al. eds., 1990).
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mented that this increase resulted from many factors:
These include a more realistic societal recognition of child molest issues
... expansion of the [Victims of Grime] Program . .. to provide for a
more comprehensive treatment for these victims and their families; and
a greater awareness, in general, by the public of the Victims of Crime
Program.
77
Unfortunately, it appears that other programs have experienced simi-
lar, if somewhat less pronounced, trends.78 Nationwide, payments for
child abuse claims rose from $6.2 million in 1986"to $36.6 million in
1991. 79 Coincidentally, the British Board also commented recently on
the noticeable increase in child abuse claims.8 0
In light of this experience, a number of states have modified their
procedural requirements in domestic violence cases. In Minnesota, a
victim of criminal sexual conduct "who does not report the crime
within [the normal limit of] five days of its occurrence is deemed to
have been unable to . . . report it within that period."8 1 In many
states, special provision is made for the victims of child sexual abuse.
For example, in Michigan, where claims must normally be filed within
one year after the commission of the crime, victims subjected to crimi-
nal sexual conduct when under the age of eighteen may report the
crime before attaining the age of nineteen and then have another
year within which to file their claim.82 In some programs, the report-
ing requirement is satisfied in domestic violence cases if the victim
makes a report to an appropriate agency other than the police. In a
related development, compensation may be awarded for "emergency
77 VICTIMS OF CRIME PROGRAM, ST. BD. OF CONTROL, CAL. CARES 15 (1990).
78 See e.g., MINN. CRIME VICTIMS REPARATIONS BD., supra note 50, at 6, 10 (child abuse
18% of all claims and 9% of payments); N.J. VIOLENT CRIMES COMP. BD.,1992-1993 ANNUAL
REPORT (child abuse and incest 8.4% of claims and 2.3% of payments); TEX. CRIME VICTIMS
COMp., supra note 50, at 16, 18 (child abuse 14.7% of claims and 5.2% of payments).
79 1994 VOCA REPORT, supra note 8, at 23. Information from the Office for Victims of
Crime for 1993, when child abuse claims represented 21% of all claims nationwide and
16.5% of payments (totalling $39 million), confirms that such claims are overwhelmingly
for sexual abuse.
80 CRIMINAL INJURIES COMP. BD., 28TH ANNUAL REPORT 1991-1992, 1992, Cmnd. 2122, at
9-10; 29TH ANNUAL REPORT 1992-1993, 1993, Cmnd. 2421, at 2. Child abuse claims, includ-
ing non-"domestic" cases, rose from 4825 in 1989-1990 to 7211 in 1992-1993. Id. This
accounts for roughly 11% of all applications. A special leaflet on "Child Abuse and the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme" was published by the Board in 1990.
81 MmN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.53(2) (a) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994). THE REPORT OF THE
ATrOrNEv GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 53 (1984) recommended that "eligi-
bility criteria should allow extended reporting periods for all cases of sexual assault when
the victim is a child or elderly person." NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 217.220(2) (a) (Michie
1992) extends this concession to minors involved in the production of pornography.
,82 MICH. ComP. LAws § 18.355 (2) (a) (1994). The Michigan program further requires
the Board to publish "an informational pamphlet or card for victims of domestic violence
explaining the legal rights and services available to them." Id. at § 18.353a. For a more
general review, see Note, Eligibility Requirements, CRIME VICTIM COMP. Q., No. 2, 1994, at 8.
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shelter care expenses" to enable a victim to avoid contact with the
offender.83
2. Law Enforcement
Although VOCA does not contain a "good samaritan" or "inter-
venor" provision for persons injured or killed while attempting to en-
force the law, most state programs, like the British Scheme,8 4 include
(or are complemented by) one. A fairly typical formula is found in
Wisconsin:
The department may order the payment of an award for personal injury
or death which results from... (a) preventing or attempting to prevent
the commission of a crime; apprehending or attempting to apprehend a
suspected criminal; aiding or attempting to aid a police officer to appre-
hend or arrest a suspected criminal; aiding or attempting to aid a victim
of a [violent] crime .... 85
It is normal for the provisions to exclude police and fire officers (and
sometimes other persons whose employment includes the duty to pro-
tect the public safety) presumably because other sources sufficiently
compensate persons who are injured or killed in the line of duty.
86
The British Scheme does not have an express exclusion, but it achieves
much the same result by stating that where a person is accidentally
injured in the course of law enforcement, compensation is not paya-
83 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.1-21(c)(3) (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); N.Y. EXEC.
LAw § 626(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1994). See also In re Heery 541 N.E.2d 1097, 1099
(Ohio Ct. Cl. 1988) (compensation for attorney fees incurred in attempt to keep parent
away from abused child's home).
84 BRirrisH SCHEME, supra note 10, 4(b). See GREER, supra note 10, at 53-59.
85 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 949.03(1) (a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1993). There are of course con-
siderable variations, but it is thought that most programs cover such cases, although Cali-
fornia, for example, has a separate program with a lower compensation limit. CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 13970 (West 1992). Some programs extend to persons "giving aid and assistance to
a member of a fire department, who is being obstructed from performing lawful duties,"
IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.1-12(8) (B) (West 1989 & Supp. 1994), or to those injured or killed
as a result of rescuing a person "in immediate danger of injury or death as a result of fire,
drowning or other catastrophe. . .. " CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13970 (West 1992).
86 See, e.g., TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 56.32(7) (West 1994); Auber v. Common-
wealth of Pa. Crime Victims Comp. Bd., 582 A.2d 76, 78 (Pa. Commw. 1990). Police of-
ficers may be covered by workers' compensation, other forms of insurance or benefits
provided under the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act of 1976. 42 U.S.C. § 3796a (1988 &
Supp. 1993) (benefits of $100,000 payable to survivors of officer killed in the line of duty).
Some programs, however, do provide for cases where other compensation may not be
available. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 631(5) (e) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1994) (compensa-
tion for unreimbursed counseling expenses of family of police officer or firefighter killed
in the line of duty); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 346.155(1) (Baldwin 1993) (sum not exceeding
$25,000 payable to family of police officer killed in the line of duty and not eligible to
receive benefits under a pension plan). See also Puntasecca v. Violent Crimes Comp. Bd.,
519 A.2d 890, 892-93 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) ("fireman's rule" does not disbar
fireman from compensation for injuries from an arson-caused fire).
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ble "unless the Board is satisfied that the applicant was at the time
taking an exceptional risk which was justified in all the
circumstances.
87
Many of the state programs provide that the claimant's effort
must be made in "good faith,"88 be one which would be expected of a
reasonable person under similar circumstances,89 or be made "law-
fully" or "not recklessly."90 However, the general rule to refuse or re-
duce an award where the victims' conduct contributed to their injury
or death does not apply to good samaritans. In addition, good samari-
tans may also be exempted, at least in part, from a general require-
ment to show "financial difficulty."9 1 Good samaritans play an active
role in crime prevention and control and should therefore receive
extra consideration of this kind. Nonetheless, it appears that relatively
few claims are made under these provisions.
C. THE NATURE OF THE INJURY
1. Primary Victims: Personal Injury
All state programs agree with the British Scheme that death and
"physical" (or "bodily") injuries resulting from a crime of violence
qualify a victim for compensation. 92 To avoid doubt, some programs
have expressly provided that "injury" includes pregnancy,93 rape "in
87 BRMSH SCHEME, supra note 10, 1 6(d); GREER, supra note 10, at 37-41, 53-59.
88 See, e.g., ARiz. CRIMINALJUSTICE COMM'N, CRIME VICTIM COMP. PROGRAM RULES R1O-4-
103(20) (1993); IDAHO CODE § 72-1003(7)(b) (Supp. 1994); N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 621(7) (Mc-
Kinney 1982 & Supp. 1994).
89 See e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24.4.1-102(10) (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-
401(7) (A) (iii) (1994); Wyo. STAT. § 1-40-102(a) (ix) (Supp. 1994) ("good faith and reason-
able effort").
90 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.03(6) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 9006(b) (1987) ("lawful"); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-7(a) (3) (Harrison 1990 & Supp.
1994); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 12-25-3(d) (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1110(9) (Law Co-
op 1985 & Supp. 1993).
91 CARROW, supra note 52, at 39. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 631(5) (c) (McKinney 1982
& Supp. 1994) (injured good samaritan may be awarded out-of-pocket losses "without re-
gard to... financial difficulty" and dependents of a good samaritan who was killed may be
awarded up to $20,000 for actual loss of support "without regard to ... financial diffi-
culty."). A good samaritan is also entitled to compensation of up to $5000 for any loss of
property suffered by him during the course of his actions. Id.
92 "Injury" is seldom defined, but problems of interpretation do not arise, possibly as a
result of minimum loss requirements. See infra text accompanying note 236. Compare ALA.
CODE § 15-23-3(3) (Supp. 1994) with OR. REv. STAT. § 147.005(4) (1993) (requiring "seri-
ous personal injury."). The current British Scheme does not include a definition, but the
Criminal Justice Act 1988 § 109 (1) provided that "'[i] njury' includes any harm to a per-
son's physical... condition .... " Id.
93 See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 351-2 (Supp. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAws § 18.351(1) (f)
(1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.52(9) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
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and of itself,"94 sexual assault "without regard to whether bodily injury
occurred,"95 and venereal and presumably other sexually transmitted
disease.96 The principal significance of such provisions is that the real
injury may be psychological or emotional rather than "physical," but if
the victim sustains even a minor "physical injury" (which might be no
more than unlawful touching), that person will qualify for compensa-
tion for mental health care and counseling.97 In such cases, victims
do not need to prove "nervous shock." However, many states still ex-
clude "non-physical" injuries because their inclusion would facilitate
fraudulent claims, complicate proof of the necessary causal connec-
tion, exacerbate the difficulties of assessing compensation, and gener-
ally add to the complexity and costs of administration. 98 Such
considerations, familiar to tort lawyers on both sides of the Atlantic,
can no longer justify a blanket exclusion of "non-physical" injuries,
and indeed, many state programs now expressly provide (as has the
British Scheme since 1964) that "injury" includes "mental or nervous
shock."99 In such cases, compensation will normally be payable (in
the absence of any "physical" injury) for any recognized psychiatric
illness traumatically induced as a result of a qualifying offense. It is at
this point, which also represents English common law, that the British
Scheme draws the line.100
94 FLA. BUREAU GUIDELINES, 10L-2.02(4) (1986).
95 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3360.B.1.B (West Supp. 1993). Under CAL.
GOVT CODE § 13960(b) (West 1992), the victim of a sexual offense who sustains "emo-
tional injury" is presumed to have sustained physical injury. Similarly in NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 217.050(3) (Michie 1993), "personal injury" includes "any harm which results from sex-
ual abuse." Id.
96 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 72-1003(6) (Supp. 1994).
97 As required by VOCA § 10602 (b) (1) (A), all programs define the expenses payable
to a victim as including "psychological" or "psychiatric" services and treatment, or both.
98 See, e.g., CARROW, supra note 52, at 33; COLO. REv. STAT. § 244.1-102(8) (Supp. 1993)
("actual bodily harm"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3360.2 (West Supp. 1993) ("physical
pain, physical illness or any impairment of physical condition .. ."); MICH. COhiP. LAWs
§ 18.351(1)(f) (1994); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 56.32(9) (West Supp. 1994) ("physi-
cal harm to a victim"); WYO. STAT. § 1-40-102(a) (vii) (Supp. 1994) ("actual bodily harm").
99 See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. tit. 20, § 351-2 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 72-1003(6)
(1994); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.52(9) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-
2 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.01(5) (West 1982 & Supp. 1993).
These terms are not normally defined, but Idaho provides that "extreme mental distress"
means "a substantial personal disorder of emotional processes, thought or cognition which
impairs judgment, behavior or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life." IDAHO
CODE § 72-1003(6) (1994).
100 Alcock and Others v. Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 A.C.
310. For a recent comparison of American and English tort law, see David Robertson,
Liability in Negligence for Nervous Shock, 57 MOD. L. REv. 649 (1994). The Criminal Justice
Act 1988 § 109(2) would have restricted compensation for "harm to a person's mental
condition" to two situations, viz., where it is attributable to the victim having been put in
fear of immediate physical injury to himself or another or to the victim being present when
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Some American programs appear to go further. "Injury" has
been defined as including "mental harm"'' and "emotional injury"
even though in the latter case compensation will not normally be
awarded "unless that injury is incurred by.a victim who also sustains
physical injury or threat of physical injury."10 2 Indeed, it has been
stated recently that "about half the states... pay for mental health
counseling for individuals who are threatened with physical harm dur-
ing a crime, but who do not sustain physical or sexual injury or con-
tact."' 03 In at least one program (New York), compensation for
counseling services is also payable to elderly and disabled victims who
have not necessarily been physically injured.104 Such provisions sug-
gest that compensation is payable even to primary victims who do not
sustain what in British terms would be classified as a "recognised psy-
chiatric illness." However, this apparent generosity may be offset by
the low limits placed on mental health care and counseling expenses
and by other safeguards designed to protect programs from excessive
or spurious claims.
2. Secondary Victims: Emotional Distress
American programs invariably provide that compensation is paya-
ble to the relatives of one who has died as a result of a crime of vio-
lence. This is meant to cover their financial losses or expenses
resulting from the death. Some programs go further than the British
another person sustained a criminal injury; these restrictions are being amplified in the
new "Tariff" Scheme. See supra note 10. The large number of nervous shock claims arising
from "the Troubles" in Northern Ireland have led to even more restrictive legislation. See
D.S. Greer, Criminal Injuries Compensation for Nervous Shock Freezing the Law in a Rigid Pos-
ture? 43 N.IREAND LEGAL Q. 396 (1992).
101 See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAWv § 621(11) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1994) ("child victim"
includes a person under 18 who suffers "mental or emotional injury... as a direct result of
a crime or as a result of witnessing a crime."). The court in In reClapacs, 567 N.E.2d 1351,
1354 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1989), held that "personal injury" includes "emotional distress and anxi-
ety due to a direct awareness of a criminal incident." The 1992 UNFoRM Acr, supra note 2,
§ 304(1), provides that compensation is payable to a victim who has suffered "physical,
emotionalor psychological injury...." (emphasis added). TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
56.32(9) (West 1994) has recently been amended to delete reference to "mental" harm,
although compensation for psychiatric care and counseling of certain secondary victims is
provided for in art. 56.32(10) (E), (F) and (H).
102 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13960(b) (West Supp. 1994) (provided threat "results in a need
for medical treatment"). NEv. REv. STAT. ANN., § 217.050.2 (Michie 1992) ("[the statute
also covers] any harm [to a minor involved in the production of pornography] which re-
suits in a need for medical treatment or any psychological or psychiatric counseling....").
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.2 (1990) (victim includes a person "who suffers personal emo-
tional injury as a direct result of being the subject of a robbery [or] abduction").
103 CVCB HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 11-2.
104 N.Y. EXEC. L w § 631(8) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1994). See also, NJ. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 13, § 13:75-1.31 (1993) (compensation payable in certain circumstances for "emotional
distress" directly related to burglary). See infra note 132.
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Scheme and provide compensation for any person (i.e., for a non-rela-
tive as well as a relative) who was in fact financially dependent, wholly
or partially, upon the deceased. 10 5
What is much more noteworthy, however, is the extent to which
American programs compensate secondary victims for non-financial
"loss." Under the British Scheme, compensation, in the form of a
fixed sum (now £7500, or approximately $11,250), is payable by way of
"bereavement," but only to the deceased's lawful spouse or to the par-
ents of an unmarried minor (i.e., a victim under the age of eight-
een).' 0 6 Unless a person has suffered "nervous shock" as a direct result
of a criminal injury to a close relative or friend, 10 7 compensation can-
not be paid even for crimes such as a rape or brutal assault, and even
if that person is his or her closest relative. In the United States, how-
ever, attention has turned to the plight of those who require mental
health care and counseling as a result of the victimization of a loved
one. Such emotional distress may be caused not only by witnessing
the crime itself, but also by experiencing the consequential effects of
the crime. California provides an example of the first case: compen-
sation is payable in certain cases to a "derivative" victim who is "an-
other [i.e., not immediate] family member of the [primary] victim,
including the victim's fiance, and witnessed the crime ... ."108 This
may add little to a "normal" nervous shock provision. What clearly
goes beyond this is the kind of provision found in a number of pro-
grams that "the spouse, parent, child, brother or sister of a victim who
is killed as a result of criminally injurious conduct is entitled to reim-
bursement for mental health treatment received as a result of the vic-
tim's death." 109 The same or a similar list of persons may also recover
105 See, e.g., MIN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.52(7) (West 1987); OHIO RE,. CODE ANN.
§ 2743.51 (D) (Baldwin 1990).
106 BRITISH SCHEME, supra note 10, 12, discussed in GREER, supra note 10, at 127-28.
This is the law in England and Wales; Scots law is more generous. Id. at 128-30. For recent
criticism of the English law, see REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT WORKING PARTY- COMPENSAT-
ING THE V14rIMS OF CRIME 1 6.04 (1993).
107 See, e.g., Regina v. Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd., ex parte Johnson, cited in THE IN-
DEPENDENT,July 22, 1994 (V, who suffered nervous shock on discovering body of murdered
friend, is entitled to compensation).
108 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 13960(a) (2) (C) & 13965(a) (1) (D) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994)
(compensation is limited to $3000). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1802 (8) (b) (iv) (West
1982 & Supp. 1994) (compensation is payable in case of death "for counseling or therapy
for any surviving family member of the victim or any person in close relationship to such
victim, if such member or person was physically present and directly observed the commis-
sion of the crime"); 740 ILCS 45/2(d) (5) (Michie 1993) ("[victim includes] a child who
personally witnessed a violent crime perpetrated or attempted against a relative").
109 See e.g., IDAHO CODE § 72-1019(9) (a) (1989 & Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
258A, § 3(d) (West 1994); NEV. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 217.160(4) (Michie 1992); N.Y. ExEC.
LAw § 626(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.3(d) (1993).
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for mental health treatment received where the primary victim has
been sexually assaulted. °10 Another recognized category is the imme-
diate family of a child victim.1 1' California goes further by permitting
certain "derivative" victims, who are members of the victim's family, to
recover compensation (limited to $3000) for mental health counsel-
ing which is necessary as a direct result of any crime which caused the
victim's injury."1
2
Until 1993, California's provision included one further type of
secondary "victim," a member of the family of the primary victim, or a
person in close relationship to that victim, "whose treatment or pres-
ence during treatment is medically required for the successful treat-
ment of the [primary] victim."" 3 As the Attorney-General's Task
Force on Family Violence explained, eligibility for psychological coun-
seling should be extended:
to include the non-offending parents of children who are victims of sex-
ual abuse. The non-offending parent is also a victim who suffers as a
result of criminal behavior. Unless the innocent parent is helped to un-
derstand the situation and that neither they nor the child is to blame,
the parent may unintentionally undermine the best efforts of a good
therapist. If not helped through their own anxieties, they cannot be a
resource and support for the child.'
14
See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 912.6.6 (West 1994) ("[includes] persons cohabitinj with or
related by blood or affinity to the victim.").
110 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 72-1019(9) (b) (1989 & Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-
128(9)(b) (1993). In In re Kaman, 598 N.E.2d 236, 240 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1991), where a
mother suffered emotional distress when she discovered that her 5-year-old girl had been
sexually assaulted, the court held that the mother was "a victim in her own right, even
though she did not witness her daughter being sexually assaulted or even learn of the
incident until four months later." But see N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 626(1) (McKinney 1982 &
Supp. 1994) (compensation only payable to "the eligible spouse of the victim of any... sex
offense who resides with the victim .. ").
I11 SeeN.Y. ExEc. LAW § 626(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1994); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 56.32(10) (H) (West Supp. 1994). A recent survey has in fact identified 18 differ-
ent secondary victim provisions among 30 programs. Note, Survey Finds Wide Variation in
Secondary Victim Coverage, CRIME VIarIM COMP. Q., No. 1, 1994, at 6-7.
112 CAL- Gov'T CODE §§ 13960(a) (2) and 13965(a)(1)(D) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
Prior to 1993, compensation of up to $10,000 was payable for medical and/or counseling
expenses to "any member of the family of [a primary victim] ... when the family member
has incurred emotional injury as a result of a crime." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13960(a) (4)
(West 1992).
113 CAL GOV'T CODE § 13960(a) (3) (West 1992). Cf. Cano v. State Bd. of Control, 9 Cal.
Rptr.2d 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (provision limited to direct victim and does not extend to
children of sister of murder victim). The current law limits the payment of compensation
to "group or family ... counseling expenses provided for the successful treatment or recov-
ery of the victim to family members of the victim .. ." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13960(d) (5)
(West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
114 TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 54. See, e.g., In re Kaman, 598 N.E.2d 236,
240 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1991) (when 5-year-old girl was sexually assaulted, compensation is paya-
ble for counseling of mother if necessary for victim's psychological well-being and mother's
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Provisions such as these acknowledge a generally accepted phe-
nomenon t ' 5 But they may have significant cost implications, given
that treatment may be required for some considerable time. '1 6 In
addition:
Compensation for mental health counselling raises particular problems,
including assessing the causal link between the [need for the] proposed
treatment and the crime, the appropriateness of the treatment modality
chosen, the qualifications of the provider and the necessary duration of
treatment. 
17
These difficulties and the dangers of spurious claims are well-known.
The problem in practice is the identification of genuine and deserv-
ing claimants. Given the difficulty of making such determinations on
a case-by-case basis, it seems almost inevitable that programs will resort
to bright line tests, with somewhat arbitrary results. But apart from
limitations to certain classes of persons, crimes, or circumstances, the
major safeguards appear to be detailed regulation of the provision of
mental health care and counseling, and the imposition of a low limit
on the compensation payable for such expenses. 1 8 As to the first, it is
not unusual to find a provision along the following lines:
[I]f treatment is likely to continue longer than six months . . .and the
cost of the additional treatment will exceed $1500, or if the total cost of
treatment in any case will exceed $4000, the provider shall first submit to
the board a plan which includes the measurable treatment goals, the
estimated cost of the treatment, and the estimated date of completion of
the treatment .... 119
A good example of the second approach is found in Maryland, where
the overall maximum is $45,000, but "compensation ... for the pur-
ability to function as a nurturing parent).
115 David S. Riggs & Dean G. Kilpatrick, Families and Friends: Indirect Victimization by Crime;
in VICTIMS OF CRIME: PROBLEMS, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 120, 134 (ArthurJ. Lurigio et al.
eds., 1990) ("While the percentage of indirect victims of crime who experience psychologi-
cal problems is apparently somewhat smaller than in the case of direct victims, the
problems they suffer are just as real."). See also Patricia A. Resick, Victims of Sexual Assault, in
VIC-rIMS OF CRIME: PROBLEMS, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 69 (Arthur J. Lurigio et al. eds.,
1990); Dean G. Kilpatrick & L.J. Veronen, The Psychological Impact of Crime, cited in VICTIMS
OF CRIME: PROBLEMS, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 85 (ArthurJ. Lurigio et al. eds., 1990).
116 See Recent Trends from VOCA Performance Reports, CRIME VICTIM COMP. Q., No. 1, 1993,
at 8. In 1992, compensation for mental health counseling was reported to have exceeded
20% of total program costs in seven states, including California, where counseling awards
totalled $29.1 million-or 39% of all compensation paid. Id.
117 NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 5.
118 See generally NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIME VICTIM COMP. BOARDS, EVALUATION AND PAYMENT
OF MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING CLAIMS (1994).
119 MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.52(8)(a)(3) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993). In Minnesota, the
Board has the power to elect to pay claims under this clause on a quarterly basis. Id. For a
summary of state mental health cost control rules, see NAT'L ASs'N OF CRIME VICTIM COMP.
BOARDS, supra note 118, Appendix A.
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poses of psychiatric, psychological or mental health counseling shall
not exceed $2000 .... 120
In spite of measures such as these, program expenditure on
mental health counseling nationwide has increased from $8.1 million
in 1987 to $48.1 million in 1991.121
3. Primary Victims: Property Damage
An established principle of the British Scheme is that "compensa-
tion will not be payable for the loss of or damage to ... any property
whatsoever ... .,,122 A similar principle operates in the United States.
Thus, VOCA funding does not cover compensation for damage to
property,123 and most state programs exclude it as well. 124 However,
compensation may be awarded for personal aids-to cover the cost of
replacing prosthetic devices such as eyeglasses, hearing aids, and den-
tures that were taken, lost, or damaged as the direct result of a qualify-
ing crime.
125
Any further provision is usually subject to strict financial limits
and may also be restricted to certain types of victims, such as elderly
victims. But in some ways, these programs are more flexible than the
British Scheme. For instance, certain programs include the reason-
able replacement value of clothing or other property held for eviden-
tiary purposes, and costs associated with securing and cleaning up a
crime scene. 126 Colorado's program allows compensation (up to
120 MD. CODE ANN. Grim. Inj. Comp. Act § 12(a) (3) (1993). The normal limit appears
to be about $2000-$3000. See Note, State Counseling Limits, CRIME VIcMrim COMp. Q., No. 1,
1994, at 7.
121 NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIME VICriM COMP. BOARDS, supra note 118, at 1. Information on
file with the Office for Victims of Crime (On file) suggests that expenditure on mental
health counseling in 1993 totalled $44.2 million, or 18.9% of total compensation.
122 BRTSH SCHEME, supra note 10, 17. Compensation for property may be included if
"the Board are satisfied that the property was relied upon by the victim as a physical aid."
Id. Note, however, that in Northern Ireland there is a statutory scheme of public compen-
sation for terrorist damage to property. See D.S. GREER & V.A. MrrCHELL, COMPENSATION
FOR CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO PROPERTY (1982).
123 42 U.S.C. § 10602(a)(1) (1988) (repealed 1988). This does not prevent state pro-
grams from using their own funds for such a purpose.
124 NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 4, 23. See also LeRoy L. Lamborn, The Scope of Programs
for Governmental Compensation of Victims of Crime 1973 U. ILL. L. F. 21, 22-29; CARRow, supra
note 52, at 34-36.
125 NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 4, 23. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.52(8) (b)
(West Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-106(b) (Supp. 1994). But see BRrriSH
SCHEME, supra note 10, 17 ("Compensation will not be payable for the loss of or damage
to clothing or any property whatsoever... unless the Board are satisfied that the property
was relied upon by the victim as a physical aid.").
126 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 912.6(3), (7) (West 1994) (limit of $100 for evidentiary
purposes, $1000 for cleaning); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R.Jus 603.01, 603.02(a) (1993) (limit of
$5000 to award for economic loss which includes securing and cleaning a crime scene and
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$250) for damage to windows, doors, locks, or other security devices
of a residential building. 12 7 Louisiana allows compensation for "a cat-
astrophic property loss," which means "loss of abode," where such loss
causes "overwhelming financial effect on the victim," but such com-
pensation is subject to that program's overall maximum of $10,000.128
Until recently, New York had led the way in the coverage of prop-
erty loss and damage, with three provisions covering the loss of or
damage to "essential personal property." First, where a victim was in-
jured or killed, compensation of up to $500 could be awarded for "the
unreimbursed cost of repair or replacement of articles of essential
personal property, lost, damaged or destroyed as a direct result of the
crime."129 These had to be "articles of personal property necessary
and essential to the health, welfare or safety of the victim,"'3 0 but
could include cash losses.13 1 Compensation could be awarded to eld-
erly or disabled victims even if they had not been physically injured.
13 2
Finally, when a "good samaritan" was injured or killed, compensation
of up to $5000 was awardable "for any loss of property.., suffered by
the victim during the course of his actions as a good samaritan."
133
Thus, compensation for property was a significant part of the compen-
sation payment in New York. In fact, in 1991-1992, almost $2 million
(15% of the amount awarded for personal injury) was paid for prop-
erty losses.1 34 However, in 1992, the limit for awards for essential per-
sonal property was reduced to $100.135 This will significantly reduce
this category of expenditure.
In some exceptional cases compensation may be payable to a vic-
tim who has suffered neither personal injury nor damage to property.
For example, in New York:
[A] n elderly or [previously] disabled victim who has not been physically
injured as a direct result of a crime, shall ... be eligible for an award that
replacement value of any clothing or bedding held for evidence purposes); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 949.06(1) (c), (cm), (f) (West Supp. 1993) (limits "evidentiary" compensation to $300 for
clothing and bedding, $200 for other property rendered unusable by crime laboratory
testing and evidentiary purposes, and $1000 for cleaning).
127 COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 24-4.1-102(8.5), 24-4.1-109(1.5) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
128 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:1802(8) (c) (West 1982). Exceptions to the $10,000 limit
are provided in LA. REv. STAT. Am. § 46:1810 (West Supp. 1994) for those victims who are
permanently, totally, or permanently and totally disabled as a result of a crime.
129 N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 631(2) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
130 Id. § 621(8).
131 Id. § 631(9).
132 Id. § 631(8).
133 Id. § 631(5) (c).
134 N.Y. STATE CRIME VIcTIMs BD., 1991-1992 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (1993). Claims for es-
sential personal property were estimated to represent 43% of the claims accepted by the
Board. Id. at 15. See also infra Table 4.
135 N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 631(9) (McKinney 1994).
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includes ... transportation expenses incurred for necessary court ap-
pearances in connection with the prosecution of such crimes .... 136
Also, in Pennsylvania, compensation is payable for:
the cash equivalent of one month's social security, railroad retirement,
S.. child support or spousal support payment, where said payment is the
primary source of the victim's income and where the victim is deprived
of the money as a direct result of a crime.13 7
IV. REFUSAL OR REDUCTION OF COMPENSATION
One of the most noteworthy features of the British Scheme is its
restriction of the payment of compensation to "innocent" victims.1 38
From the outset, the Board has been required, or has been given dis-
cretion, to refuse compensation altogether or to make a reduced
award to "unmeritorious" victims who otherwise qualify for compensa-
tion. The very concept of the "innocent" victim has given rise to
much academic controversy and practical difficulty.'3 9 State legisla-
tures have actually dealt with this issue in the United States by creating
three main categories of victims who, to a greater or lesser extent, fail
to qualify as "innocent" or deserving: (a) the "guilty" victim; (b) the
uncooperative victim, and (c) the financially sound victim.
A. THE GUILTY VICTIM
Consideration of the British Scheme and of state programs
reveals that legislators do not see victims as simply "guilty" or "inno-
cent." In fact, it is difficult to do justice to the seemingly infinite vari-
ety of provisions. The clearest case is the injured victim who is guilty
of the crime or is an accomplice of the offender. Such a victim is
patently "guilty" of criminal conduct which contributed to the injury.
It does not inevitably follow that the victims should be denied com-
136 Id. § 631(8).
137 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7 (1993). In 1992-1993, such cases accounted for 28% of
all awards, but only 5% of compensation paid. PA. CRIME VIrriM's COMP. BD., ANNUAL
REPORT 1992-1993, supra note 61, at 26, 29 (1994) (emphasizing that such compensation is
limited to one month's entitlement). In 1992, this category was expanded to include any
retirement, pension, or disability check proceeds. Id.
138 "The Board may withhold or reduce compensation if they consider that.... having
regard to the conduct of the applicant before, during or after the events giving rise to the
claim or to his character as shown by his criminal convictions or unlawful conduct ... it is
inappropriate that a full award, or any award at all, be granted." BRrrMSH SCHEME, supra
note 10, 6(c), discussed in GREER, supra note 10, at 60-79, and MTERS, supra note 10, at 72-
99.
139 See, e.g., David P, Miers, Compensation and Conceptions of Victims of Crime, 8 Vic.
TiMOLOGy 204 (1983); CANE, supra note 12, at 263-65. See CARROW, supra note 52, at 44, for
an interesting attempt to justify such provisions by reference to the tort, welfare, and risk-
sharing "theories" underlying the award of public compensation in the United States.
1994]
DESMOND S. GREER [Vol. 85
pensation, but that is the result in all state programs. 140 At the other
end of the spectrum are the victims whose conduct was neither crimi-
nal nor contributory to their injuries, but who may not deserve com-
pensation because of their immoral conduct or simply bad
character-e.g., the work-shy, the philandering husband, and the "no-
good" drifter. No program has been found which refuses compensa-
tion on these grounds-although many refuse compensation to
prison inmates,14 1 and some take lesser offenses into account.1 42 Be-
tween these two extremes are numerous intermediate provisions, and
it is hoped that what follows will give some impression of what are, at
times, the finely shaded distinctions between them.
Victims who, while not guilty of the crime itself, "initiated," "pro-
voked," "encouraged," "consented to," "facilitated," "colluded with,"
"(knowingly and willingly) participated in any way in," or "prolonged"
the commission of the offense are normally refused compensation.'
43
Also, victims who were guilty of some other offense "which violation
caused or contributed to the victim's injury or death,"' 44 or who were
guilty of "intentional or knowing unlawful conduct which substantially
provoked or aggravated the incident giving rise to the injury,"1 45 are
not compensated. In some programs, victims may be penalized for
"contributory fault,"' 46 for "contributing to the infliction of death or
140 States use different formulae, but Pennsylvania provides a typical statute: "[a] per-
son who is criminally responsible for the crime upon which a claim is based or an accom-
plice of such person shall not be eligible to receive compensation with respect to such
claim." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.3(b) (1993).
141 See infra note 28.
142 See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 949.08(2) (g) (West Supp. 1993) (compensation not paya-
ble if victim delinquent in child support or maintenance payments); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:4B-18 (West Supp. 1994) (Board may deny or reduce compensation where "victim has
not paid in full any payments owed on [compensation] assessments... or restitution or-
dered following conviction for a crime."). See infra text accompanying notes 153 to 161.
143 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-23-12(a) (2) (Supp. 1994); ARIZ. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N,
CRIME VICTIM COMP. PROGRAM RULES R1O-4-103(3) (1993); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13964(c) (1)
(West Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9006(1) (1992); HAW. REv. STAT. § 351-31(c)
(1985); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-10 (West 1986).
144 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.080(c) (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-211(b)(2)
(Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-401(7)(B) (1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3360-
C(2) (B) (West Supp. 1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1822(3) (Supp. 1993). See also In re Mc-
Neil, 453 N.E.2d 1309, 1313 (Ohio CL Cl. 1983) (victim's solicitation of a prostitute may be
sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute contributory misconduct so as to deny the victim
award of reparations).
145 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-401(7)(B) (1994) (excluding any person injured or
killed "as an indirect result of his or her participation in an unlawful or criminal activity");
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9006(c) (1987); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 34, § 164(b) (4) (1994) (com-
pensation refused if victim and offender "at the time when the injury or death was caused,
were engaged in a common unlawful enterprise or activity").
146 See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-h(IV) (1993); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. §
611A.54(2) (West Supp. 1994) (refers to "contributory misconduct"). Some statutes pro-
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injury,"' 47 or for "other behavior [or conduct] ... that directly or
indirectly contributed to the victim's injury or death.' 48 In Louisi-
ana, victims may have their compensation refused or reduced if their
"behavior... at the time of the crime was such that the victim bears
some measure of responsibility for the crime."'
49
These formulae clearly differ as to whether the conduct to be
considered must be criminal, unlawful (tortious), or some other form
of "misconduct." 50 But all agree that the relevant conduct must both
take place at or about the time of the crime which gave rise to the
victim's injury and "contribute" in some way to the infliction of that
injury. Illinois and Ohio Programs contain variations on these provi-
sions. In Illinois, compensation may be reduced or denied "according
to the extent to which... any prior criminal conviction or conduct of
the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to [that victim's]
injury or death;"' 51 Ohio penalizes "any conduct of the victim.., that
vide that a victim may be penalized for having "engaged in conduct which should have
been foreseen as leading to death or injury." Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 346.140(3) (Michie/
Bobb-Merril 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.08(2) (a) (West 1982). A similar test was applied
by the court in Evans v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control, 398 S.E.2d 880, 885 (N.C. C. App.
1990), stay granted, 400 S.E.2d 446 (N.C. 1991). In Maryland, compensation may be re-
duced or denied if the victim "unreasonably failed to avoid a physical confrontation with
the offender." MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 12(e) (3) (Supp. 1992). But cf. In reThorpe, 593
N.E.2d 499, 503 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1990) (holding that the victim may have been negligent but
was not guilty of "unlawful or intentionally tortious" conduct, even though he got into a car
whose driver he knew to be intoxicated).
147 IDAHO CODE § 72-1016(7) (b) (Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.1-34(a) (Bums
1994); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 18.361(5) (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-125(7)
(1993); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 631.5(a) (McKinney 1994). Under GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-8(d)
(1994), the board may consider conduct which contributed to the infliction of injury or
financial hardship.
148 ALAsKA STAT. § 18.67.080(c) (1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9006(b) (1992); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 960.13(6) (West Supp. 1994); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 217.180(l) (Michie
1992); see, e.g., Industrial Accident Bd. v. Martinez, 836 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that victim's membership of an allegedly "hazardous profession," such as a secur-
ity guard in an allegedly "rough" bar, would not in itself constitute "behavior" contributing
to victim's death).
149 L&. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1809 (B) (4) (a) (West 1982); see also HAw. REv. STAT. § 351-
31(c) (1985); Tnx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 56.45 (2) (West Supp. 1994) (victims not enti-
tled to conspensation if their behavior "bears a share of the responsibility for the [injury]
f."); f 1992 UNIFORM Acr, supra note 2, § 309(a) (advising that a board "may reduce or
deny compensation to a claimant who is accountable for the crime or a crime arising from
the same conduct, criminal episode or plan"). But cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.9(f)
(Purdon 1993) (conduct of victim "shall not be considered" where the crime is rape).
150 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-401(7) (B) (1994) (distinction between "unlawful" and
"criminal" activity); Evans v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control, 398 S.E.2d 880, 885 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1990) (Greene, J.) ("[wihile misconduct includes unlawful conduct as a matter of
law, it may be something less than unlawful conduct, though more than an act done in
poor taste. Misconduct requires some deviation from the accepted norm or standard of
proper behavior...").
151 740 ILCS 45/10.1(d) (Michie 1993); see alsoWyo. STAT. § 1-40-110(b)(i) (1988) (in-
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is unlawful or intentionally tortious and that, without regard to the
conduct's proximity in time or space to the criminally injurious con-
duct, has a causal relationship to the criminally injurious conduct that
is the basis of the claim."
1 5 2
But a victim may also be penalized for non-contributory
(mis)conduct. That appears to be the import of a Florida provision
stating that "any person who... [w]as engaged in an unlawful activity
at the time of the crime upon which the claim is based, shall not be
eligible to receive an award .... -153 The Ohio program goes further:
[The commissioners] shall [not] make an award to ... a victim [or a
claimant], who, within ten years prior to the criminally injurious con-
duct that gave rise to the claim, was convicted of a felony or who is
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.., to have engaged, within
ten years prior to... [such] criminally injurious conduct.... in conduct
that, if proven by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, would constitute a
felony .... 154
structing a board to take into account "all circumstances surrounding the victim's conduct
determined to be relevant which directly contributed to the victim's injury").
152 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.51(M) (Baldwin 1990). See also In reJones, 546 N.E.2d
978 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1988) (where victim slapped offender and offender left, returned with a
gun, and shot and killed victim, the court held that victim engaged in contributory miscon-
duct). Cf W. VA. CODE § 14-2A-3(1) (Supp. 1994) (adds "the voluntary intoxication of the
claimant... when the intoxication has a causal connection or relationship to the injury
sustained"). But cf In re Uhnak, 578 N.E.2d 906 (Ohio CL Cl. 1988) (where victim at-
tempted to hit offender with a bar table and offender left, the court held that victim did
not engage in contributory misconduct because offender's reaction was not foreseeable);
In re Ewing, 515 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1987) (where victim and offender had history of
past confrontations, victim slapped offender, and offender subsequently ran down victim
with automobile, the court held that victim did not engage in contributory misconduct
because offender's reaction must be foreseeable in light of victim's conduct in order to
satisfy the causal connection requirement).
153 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.065(2) (b) (West Supp. 1994). MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 61 1A.53(2) (d) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) is similar, but it is expressly limited to the
victim or claimant who was "in the act of committing a crime at the time the injury oc-
curred." See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68.070(3)(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (V
committingflony). In UTAH CODEANN. § 63-63-15(1)(b) (1993), the Reparations officer
may take into account "the misconduct of the claimant or of a victim through whom he
claims." IDAHO CODE § 72-1016(7) (b) (1989 & Supp. 1994), is more precise: compensa-
tion is reduced by 50% if at the time of the injury V was engaged in a felony. A further
reduction is required if V's actions contributed to the injury. Id.
154 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.60(E) (Baldwin 1990). In In re Cowan, 499 N.E.2d 937
(Ohio Ct. Cl. 1986) and State ex rel. Madden v. Brown, 519 N.E.2d 865 (Ohio Ct. App,
1987), this provision was held to be constitutional as being rationally related to the state's
legitimate interest of ensuring that awards were made only to innocent, law-abiding victims
of crime. But see In reGumpf, 541 N.E.2d 501 (Ohio CL Cl. 1989) (provision not applicable
to claimant where victim deceased); In reJackson, 619 N.E.2d 1238 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1993)
(provision does not apply to felonies committed after offense giving rise to claim). See also
ARL CODE ANN. § 16-90.712(a) (5) (Michie Supp. 1993) (compensation not payable to vic-
tim convicted of felony involving criminally injurious conduct); ALA. CODE § 15-23-23
(Supp. 1994) (a victim who is convicted of felony after making an application is not eligible
for compensation); Wvo. STAT. § 1-40-106(c) (1988 & Supp. 1994) (same); CAL. GOV'T
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Such a provision is redolent of one of the most controversial as-
pects of the British Scheme-that the Board may refuse compensation
because of conduct by the victim (or claimant) that in no way contrib-
uted to the injury for which the victim claims compensation. Until
1990, the Board could refuse or reduce compensation by reference to
the victim's "character and way of life." Presently, the Board may con-
sider the victim's "character as shown by his criminal convictions or
unlawful conduct."'5 5 Some American programs may achieve the
same result by reference to an even more general formula: "In deter-
mining whether to make an order under this section, the board shall
consider all circumstances determined to be relevant, including...
the prior case or social history, if any, of the victim... and any other
relevant matters."' 5 6 It is not clear what this means, and there appears
to be no relevant American caselaw. 1' 7 Coincidentally, Northern Ire-
land uses similar language in its statutory scheme. 158 The courts there
have held it to connote "any circumstance which logically or reason-
ably bears on the question whether the applicant ought to receive or be denied
compensation."'59 This in turn has been taken to include:
[C]ircumstances related to the conduct of the applicant, circumstances
in the events leading up to and subsequent to the injury, his conduct in
relation to the injury after it had been received, his conduct in relation
to those who inflicted the injury.., and his conduct in pursuing the
claim.16
0
CODE § 13960.2(a), (c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (compensation may be paid to a person
convicted of felony (whether or not imprisoned) "only after . .. all awards ... to the
nonfelon applicants have been made").
155 BRrrsH SCHEME, supra note 10, 6(c). See Regina v. Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd., ex
parteThompstone and Crowe, [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1234; MiERs, supra note 10, at 76-82 and 91-
99.
156 ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.080(c) (1991). See also DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9006(b)
(1987); HAW. REv. STAT. § 351-31(c) (1985 & Supp. 1992); NEv. Rv. STAT. ANN.
§ 217.180(1) (Michie 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-10(c) (1986). The Alaska and Nevada
programs refer to "the prior case or social history, if any, of the victim .... " N.J. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 13, § 13:75-1.6(d) (1993) refers to "the prior case history of the victim, which may
also include matters pertaining to the victim's medical history...."
157 A LEXIS search revealed no caselaw interpreting this phrase, nor has the author
come across definitions or explanations in those administrative rules which he has con-
sulted. Compare with Smith; supra note 17, at 71, who states that the "relevant circum-
stances" provision in NewJersey means that "a victim with a demonstrable criminal history
may be denied recovery ... based, at least in part, upon his own criminal record"-but no
authority is given.
158 Criminal Injuries (Compensation) Order 1988, N. Ir. Stat. (S.I. No. 793 (N.I.4)), art.
6(1) (1988). The phrase appears to have originated in New Zealand. Criminal Injuries
Compensation Act, N.Z. Stat. 1963, No. 134 § 17(3). It was not used in the British Scheme.
159 Cahill v. Secretary of State, [1977] N. Ir. 53, 57 (emphasis added) (quoting Cahill v.
Secretary of State, [1976] N.IJ.B. 9 (High Ct.)). See D.S. GREER, COMPENSATION FOR CRIMI-
NAL INJURY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 108 (1990).
160 Moore v. Secretary of State, [1977] N. Ir. 14, 18 (McGonigal, LJ.).
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The full sweep of this definition has not been explored in the courts,
but it has been held to include "circumstances discreditable to the
victim which, like provocation or negligent behavior, render him
more likely to suffer injury or death from attack," and failure by vic-
tims to follow medical advice relating to the treatment of their
injury.
16 1
All of these provisions have theoretical significance in that they
elaborate upon the concept of the "innocent" or "deserving" victim.
They also confer upon a board a substantial amount of discretion,
which qualifies a victim's "right" to compensation. As a result, the
question of misconduct by a victim or applicant is "one of the most
difficult and important issues facing compensation programs." 162 In
practice, this question may, and indeed may be required to, be deter-
mined by administrative regulations or guidelines which indicate in
more detail the (contributory) misconduct which the board will take
into account.
1 6 3
Such guidelines may, however, also confirm the broad scope of
the board's power to refuse or reduce compensation. For example,
the Pennsylvania Rules provide that the Board should take into ac-
count "the behavior of a victim, including illegal activity, relating to
the circumstances which gave rise to the claim determined not only at
the instance of a crime but also from the past practices of the vic-
tim. 1 6 4 They continue:
A claimant may be ineligible [for compensation] if...
(i) the victim initiated, provoked or prolonged a physical confrontation
with the offender;
1 65
161 Cahi, [1977] N. Ir. at 57-58. See generally GREER, supra note 159, at 107-18.
162 CVCB HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 11-4. Section VI of this handbook provides a
helpful analysis of the current provisions.
163 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-63-2(21) (1993) ("Misconduct... means conduct...
as provided by rules promulgated by the board..."). Cf CVCB HANDBOOK, supra note 56,
atVI-1 ("many [programs] simply proceed on a case-by-case basis, and rulings may vary to a
significant degree"). In a number of programs, the burden of proving that the victim was
guilty of "contributory misconduct" is normally on the state. Under OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2743.60(F) (Baldwin 1990), however, the claimant has the burden of proof on this issue
if (1) he "was convicted of a felony more than ten years prior to [injury] ... or has a record
of felony arrests," or (2) "[tlhere is good cause to believe that the victim engaged in an
ongoing course of criminal conduct within five years or less of the criminally injurious
conduct that is the subject of the claim." See, e.g., In re Martin, 578 N.E.2d 562, 564 (Ohio
Ct. Cl. 1988).
164 37 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 191.1 and 191.9(k) (2) (1994). For similar guidelines, see
D.C. MUN. REGs., tit. 28, § 2309.9 (1992), FLA. VicrIM COMP. PROGRAM RULES, r. 2A-
2.003(h) and MINN. R. § 7505.2900 (1994). The British Board has published detailed
guidelines. See CRIMINAL INJURIES COMP. BD., GUIDE 1 30-36 (1991), discussed in GREER,
supra note 10, at 63-79.
165 See also Branson v. Violent Crimes Comp. Div., 505 N.E.2d 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (V
and X involved in fight, which ended; V then initiated a second fight in which he was
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(ii) the victim was participating in an illegal drug transaction;166 drunk
in public; creating a public disorder; frequenting a place of prostitution;
frequenting a place where drugs or alcohol are illegally bought, sold or
consumed; 167 frequenting a place where illegal gambling is conducted,
or participating in other illegal conduct ....
The Rules further provide that "contributory conduct" may include
"conduct where the victim used poor judgment causing him to place
himself in a situation where bodily injury would occur,168 the victim
used poor judgment because of intoxication or drug involvement, or
both."
Such guidelines may be stated to be inapplicable in certain spe-
cial cases, such as sexual assaults or domestic abuse. 169 Special provi-
sion may also be made for claims arising out of (criminal) road
accidents. In Louisiana, for example, the Board may reduce compen-
killed; compensation refused). Compare with In re Strong, 577 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio Ct. Cl.
1988) (V had argument with O's wife; 0 went to get his shotgun; the argument had ended
and V was leaving when 0 returned and shot and killed V; V's defendants awarded full
compensation because (i) abusive language alone does not constitute contributory miscon-
duct, and (ii) the argument was not the proximate cause of V's death, the "determining
superseding cause" of which was O's conduct); Cooper v. Dep't of Employment Serv., 588
A.2d 1172 (D.C. 1991) (V initiated argument with two men which escalated into physical
confrontation during which V was severely beaten; Board not entitled to hold that V ineli-
gible for compensation solely for initiating argument); Anne B. v. State Bd. of Control, 209
Cal. Rptr. 83 (Ct. App. 1984) (V rped by man with whom she had had "on-off" relation-
ship; no contributory misconduct because O's "past romantic or sexual involvement with
[V] does not in any way legitimate an act of force or violence"). A victim is also entitled to
act in self-defense. See, e.g., 37 PA. CODE § 191.9(k) (2) (i) (1994); In reMarshall, 566 N.E.2d
198 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1989) (V used knife in self-defense; shot dead by 0; V may not have been
wise, but entitled to defend herself, no contributory misconduct).
166 See, e.g., Spicer v. Delaware Violent Crimes Comp. Bd., No. CIV.A.91A-03-002, 1991
Del. Super. LEXIS 281 (August 9, 1991). In Spicer, 0 duped V and a female companion
into buying fake cocaine. V realized this almost immediately and jumped into car driving
after 0, eventually forcing 0 to stop. A fight ensued in which V was injured. The court
denied compensation. Id.
167 See also McMillan v. Crime Victims Comp. Bd., 399 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Mich. Ct. App.
1986). In McMillan, V was shot in an unlicensed bar. Although mere presence in the bar
violated a criminal statute, Vwas not responsible for contributory misconduct because gun-
shot injury not a reasonably foreseeable risk of being there. As the court stated, "if the risk
of injury due to the victim's particular type of violation of a criminal statute is very remote
and unforeseeable, the Board cannot deny or reduce his award ... ." Id.
168 See, e.g., In re Pettry, 587 N.E.2d 983, 984 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1990) ("[W]hen a 'victim'
challenges another, or the 'victim' accepts the challenge of another, to engage in a physi-
cal encounter, or voluntarily participates in a multi-person fracas, wherein ... any of the
parties receive physical injuries, whether by fair or foul means, such 'victim's' conduct
constitutes 'contributory misconduct' .. ."); In reJones, 546 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ohio Ct. Cl.
1988) (refusing to compensate V due to contributory misconduct, applying test "whether a
prudent, reasonable man would or would not expect retaliation in a violent manner").
169 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.9(f) (1993) ("[Where the crime was rape...
the conduct of the victim shall not be considered . . . ."). See also MINN. R. 7505.2900
(1994) ("Any of these provisions may be waived in cases of domestic abuse or sexual
assault.").
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sation if the vehicle operated by the victim was uninsured, the victim
was a willing passenger in a vehicle driven by a drunken driver, or the
victim was not wearing a seat-belt.
170
In some of these "misconduct" cases the Board has no discretion.
If certain circumstances exist, it must refuse or reduce compensation.
In other cases the Board may refuse or reduce compensation. Where
reduction is appropriate, the Board is normally required to reduce
the award "in proportion to what [it] finds to be the victim's contribu-
tion to the infliction of death or injury." Such a decision may, how-
ever, be facilitated by the use of broad reduction "bands.'
171
B. THE UNCOOPERATIVE VICTIM
Another common principle of "public" compensation for the vic-
tims of crime is the requirement that the victim cooperate with the
police and all other relevant authorities. Thus, the British Board
may withhold or reduce compensation if they consider that (a) the ap-
plicant has not taken, without delay, all reasonable steps to inform the
police.., of the circumstances of the injury and to cooperate with the
police.., or (b) the applicant has failed to give all reasonable assistance
to the Board .... 172
Similarly, a compensation program is eligible for federal financial
assistance under VOCA only if "such program promotes victim coop-
eration with the reasonable requests of law enforcement authori-
ties."' 173 Such a requirement is largely unnecessary, since state
170 LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 46:1809(4) (c)-(e) (West Supp. 1994). See also N.J. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 13, § 13:75-1.7(i) (1993) (no compensation where V is passenger who knew or
reasonably should have known driver under influence of drink or drugs); MINN. R.
7505.2900(B) (1994) (compensation refused or reduced where V knowingly and willingly
in vehicle operated by driver under influence of drink or controlled substances). In New-
man v. Delaware Violent Crimes Comp. Bd., No. CIV.A.92A-03-004, 1993 Del. Super.
LEXIS 39 (Feb. 9, 1993), a passenger was killed in an accident caused by the driver of the
car. Because both passenger and driver were intoxicated, the passenger's relatives were
refused compensation. In In re Sotak, 585 N.E.2d 580 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1990), the court re-
fused to find V guilty of contributory misconduct, even though V was not wearing a seat
belt when a car driven by a drunk driver crashed. The court reasoned that "[t]he essence
of contributory misconduct is the causal connection between the injured party's conduct
and the offender's conduct rather than the injuries arising from that conduct Put simply, the
offender's decision to drive drunk was not motivated or instigated by the applicant's deci-
sion not to wear a seat belt." Id. See also supra text accompanying note 59.
171 See, e.g., FLA. VICrIM COMP. PROGRAM RULES, 2A-2003(2) (h) (4) (1992) ("Contributory
assessments shall be made in increments of 25%. When the assessment exceeds 50%, the
claim shall be denied."). In HAW. REv. STAT. § 351-31 (c) (1992), "if [the victim's] propor-
tion [of responsibility for the crime] is greater than the responsibility of the [offender] ...
the [Board] shall not award any compensation to such victim." For an illuminating analy-
sis of other factors which may affect the exercise of these powers, see CVCB HANDBOOK,
supra note 56, at VI-4 to VI-7.
172 BRrrisH SCHEME, supra note 10, 6.
173 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b) (2) (1988). The VOCA Guidelines allow each state to deter-
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programs invariably require both that the crime is reported promptly
(normally within two to five days) to the police and that afterwards the
victim cooperates with the prosecuting authorities and with the adju-
dicating body; failure to satisfy the adjudicating body in any of these
regards normally leads to the refusal-or forfeiture-of compensa-
tion.174 With regard to the former requirement, the rationale has
been summarized as follows:
First, prompt notification ... increases the chances of apprehending the
offender. Second, the encouragement of crime reporting leads to... a
better picture of the overall crime situation. [Third] is the idea that one
who does not report a crime has failed in his public duty and thereby
waived his right to receive public aid. Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tant, the reporting requirement is seen as a means of curbing fraud.' 75
These principles of prompt reporting and cooperation are not an is-
sue in any program. What may cause difficulty in practice is whether
the victim had any "good," 'Just," or "reasonable" cause for failing to
comply promptly with such requirements, and what is meant by "rea-
sonable cooperation" with the authorities. Apart from recognizing
particular cases where a victim may indeed have good reason for not
making a prompt report to the police, 176 compensation programs are
also recognizing the difficulties which particularly vulnerable classes
of victims-e.g., victims of sexual offenses, domestic violence, and
child abuse-may face.
177
mine what such co-operation entails. CVCB HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at I-3.
174 See, e.g., CAL. Govr. CODE § 13962(c) (Deering 1994) ("The victim shall co-operate
with... the [B]oard ... in the verification of the information contained in the application;
[if he fails to do so] ... the [B]oard... in its discretion, may reject the application on this
ground alone"); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.1-19 (Bums 1994) ("A claimant who fails to fully
cooperate with law enforcement personnel... after an award is paid forfeits the award.").
175 CARROW, supra note 52, at 47. See also CVCB HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 1-3 ("Vic-
tims who frustrate law enforcement efforts should not be rewarded with public funds.").
176 See, e.g., White v. Violent Crimes Comp. Bd., 388 A.2d 206 (N.J. 1978) ("[A report
may be delayed] for the period of the victim-applicant's crime-induced incapacity in cir-
cumstances where the late-filing of the application for compensation does not prejudice
the ability of the Board to verify the victim's eligibility."). See also TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 1,
§ 61.6 (1992) ("[T]he limitation period will not include that period of physical incapacity
which reasonably prevented the claimant from filing an application. .. ").
177 The 1984 ATTORNEY GEN. TASK FORCE REP. ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 53 (1984) recom-
mended that "[e]ligibility criteria should allow extended reporting periods for all cases of
sexual assault when the victim is a child or elderly person." See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 912.4(3) (West 1994) (provision for report to Dep't of Human Services, instead of local
police, if crime allegedly committed by person responsible for care of child); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 61 1A.53(2) (a) (West Supp. 1994) (relaxation of time limit for reporting crime for
victims of criminal sexual conduct); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 631 (1) (McKinney 1994) (same);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 595.030.2 (1994) (if V under 18, report to police may be made by mem-
ber of family, doctor, nurse, or by division of family services personnel); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 53-9-125(1) (1993) (relaxation of filing requirement for victims of the "Childhood Crimi-
nal Act"); WAsH REv. CODE § 7.68.060(3) (1994) (same).
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The administrative codes also provide further details of the gen-
eral requirement of cooperation:
[In determining whether] the claimant has ... fully cooperated with
appropriate law enforcement agencies, the following criteria shall be
used:
(a) The claimant's failure to prosecute a person who engaged in crimi-
nally injurious conduct or appear as a witness constitutes noncoopera-
tion and the claim shall be denied;
178
(b) The claimant initially decided not to prosecute but later changed
his mind. If this causes a person who engaged in criminally injurious
conduct to escape prosecution or directly negatively affects the prosecu-
tion, the claim shall be denied;
(c) If law enforcement authorities indicate that the claimant was reluc-
tant to give information pertaining to the claim, failed to appear when
requested without good cause, gave false or misleading information, or
attempted to avoid law enforcement authorities, the award may be re-
duced or denied; 179
(d) an operational unit may make a full award to an uncooperative
claimant if the claimant can convincingly demonstrate that the failure to
cooperate was due to a compelling health or safety risk.'8 0
C. THE FINANCIALLY SOUND VICTIM
Criminal injuries compensation in Great Britain has never been
means tested. It comes as something of a surprise, therefore, to find
that in 1983 approximately one-third of all programs in the United
States had financial tests requiring claimants to prove that they would
suffer "substantial financial hardship" if not awarded compensation,
or enjoining the Board to take the victim's financial resources into
178 In In re Dray, 579 N.E.2d 788 (Ohio CL Cl. 1989), and Ellis v. North Carolina Crime
Victims Comp. Comm'n, 432 S.E.2d 160 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), the courts held that V's
refusal to prosecute 0 is not in itself a failure to cooperate fully with law enforcement
authorities. The Court in Dray, however, added that:
As a general rule, any action, inaction, or inexcusable neglect by an applicant which
substantially impedes or impairs investigation or prosecution proceedings which have
been initiated by the law enforcement authorities, or which would have been initiated
but for the action, inaction, or inexcusable neglect, constitutes a failure to fully coop-
erate ....
In re Dray, 579 N.E.2d at 78990.
179 See, e.g., In re Simmons, 579 N.E.2d 311 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1989) (V refused to name or
describe assailant and failed to appear at trial, despite assuring prosecutor that he would
appear; compensation denied). But see, e.g., Randall v. Department of Employment Serv.,
551 A.2d 90 (D.C. 1988) (V who engaged in "harassing and disruptive tactics" directed
against a prosecutor who had decided not to prosecute V's assailant was held not to be
guilty of failure to co-operate with the prosecutor).
180 ARiz. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N, CRIME VICTIM COMP. PROGRAM RULES R1O-4-
108(E) (3) (d) (1993). See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-403(c) (3) (1994) (V excused from testi-
fying if subject to "a substantial risk of serious physical or emotional injury"); FLA. CRIM.
INJ. COMP. GUIDELINES, r. 10L.4-06; 37 PA. CODE § 191.9(C) (1992).
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account when determining whether to make an award.' 8 ' However:
A number of states are considering eliminating the means test due to the
high costs of investigations regarding financial hardship, the gross ineq-
uities that can occur in denying benefits to victims who have been dili-
gent in saving money (especially when those victims are the elderly on
fixed incomes), and the chilling effect that such means tests can have on
the willingness of victims, even those experiencing severe financial hard-
ship, to apply for compensation.
182
These considerations obviously had effect. By 1991, the number of
programs with means tests had gone down considerably,18 3 though
they still apply in such populous states as Florida, Michigan, and New
York.'84 A typical provision is that found in the District of Columbia:
An award of compensation shall be denied if it is determined that the
claimant will not suffer undue financial hardship if not granted financial
assistance .... A claimant suffers undue financial hardship if the claim-
ant cannot maintain the customary level of health, safety, and education
for himself or herself or his or her dependents .... 185
Such general provisions are then usually, and sometimes required to
be,' 8 6 supplemented by rules indicating, in detail, what resources and
liabilities the Board must consider or ignore.' 8 7 On occasion, the stat-
ute also gives the Board a precise indication of what constitutes "un-
due financial hardship." Thus, the Florida statute, until recently,
advised that
181 McGiLLis & SMITH, supra note 1, at 19 (1983). See also CARROW, supra note 52, at 54.
But does it reflect "welfare" theory? The "clear preference" of the 1973 UNIFORM Acr,
supra note 2, was "to eliminate any 'financial needs' or 'financial stress' test as a condition
precedent to receipt of benefits." Commrs Prefatry Note. See 11 UNIFORM LAWs ANN: CRIMI-
NAL LAw AND PROCEDURE 33 (1974). The 1992 UNIFORM Acr, supra note 2, contains no
provision requiring economic or financial hardship on the part of the victim. Id. at 375.
182 McGiLLTis & SMrrH, supra note 1, at 19.
183 NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 23, places the figure at 11, but note that this report
does not cover 10 or so programs. The test frequently does not apply to small awards, such
as those under $5000, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 631(6) (a) (McKinney 1994), or to "good samari-
tans," N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 631(5) (c) (McKinney 1994).
184 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.13(7) (West 1993); MICH. COMP. LAws § 18.361(6) (1994);
N.Y. EXEc. LAw § 631(6) (a) (McKinney 1994) (not applicable to awards under $5000).
185 D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-403(c) (1) (1994) (emphasis added). But see D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-
402(a) (5) (allowing this requirement to be waived "in cases involving extraordinary cir-
cumstances where the interests of justice so require"). Cf N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 631(6) (d)
(McKinney 1994) (whereby the Board is advised that, "nothing contained in this [provi-
sion] shall be construed to mean that the [B]oard must maintain the same standard of
living enjoyed by the claimant prior to the death or injury").
186 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 346.140(3) (Baldwin 1993) requires "specific standards by
rule." For an example of a very detailed provision, see 1973 UNIFORM Acr, supra note 2,
§ 5(g). But see supra note 181. The N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 631(6)(e) (McKinney 1994) also
provides a detailed financial test.
187 See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2A-2.003(3) (1992); MICH. COMP. LAvs
§ 18.361(6) (1994); NEB. Rev. STAT. §81-1822(5) (1992); Nav. Rev. STAT. ANN.
§ 217.220(4) (Michie 1992); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 631(6) (McKinney 1994).
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A serious financial hardship is considered to exist if the victim's ...
liquid assets are not adequate on a dollar basis to absorb the loss created
as a result of the injury... and/or if the difference in the victim's an-
nual net excess income and the loss incurred as a result of the crime
does not exceed 10% of the victim's net income or $2500, whichever is
greater.1
88
Suppose a victim had a net annual income of $29,000, net annual ex-
penses of $19,000, and, as a result of the injury, incurred a financial
loss of $7000. The difference between the net excess income
($10,000) and the loss is $3000, which exceeds ten percent of the net
annual income (which in turn exceeds $2500). Therefore, the victim
does not suffer "serious financial hardship" as a result of the injury
and is not entitled to any compensation. But a more generous test
has since been introduced. Compensation is now payable where "the
claimant's assets at the time of the crime were less than the actual loss
amount plus six months' estimated income prior to the crime." 189
Thus, a victim who had no assets at the time of the injury would now
be entitled to compensation. 190
D. OVERALL EFFECT OF "MISCONDUCT" PROVISIONS
The net result of the "refusal" provisions in the British Scheme is
that approximately one-third of all applications are denied.19t In the
United States, it has been estimated that "the number of claims
awarded equaled about seventy percent of the number of claims
filed."19 2 A more useful indication may be the number of denials as a
percentage of the number of claims determined. As may be expected-
and no doubt in part as a result of different classification criteria-the
picture varies from state to state, as indicated by Table 2.193 However,
it is noticeable that overall denial rates, while sometimes lower and
sometimes higher, appear generally to be of much the same order in
188 FLA. GUIDELINES (1986), ch. 10L-4.01(4). The example which follows was given in
these Guidelines.
189 FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 2A-2.003(3)(d) (4) (1992).
190 But see NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1822(5) (1992), which follows 1973 UNIFORM ACT, supra
note 2, § 5(g)(2) (whether V's loss exceeds 10% of his "net financial resources" as defined
in the statute). In New York, where the test is "financial difficulty [taking into account] ...
all relevant factors," a victim with savings of $24,000, stocks worth $4275 and an interest in
some real property did not suffer financial hardship when he incurred a loss of $594 as the
result of a crime. See Regan v. Crime Victims Comp. Bd., 442 N.Y.S.2d 170 (App. Div.
1981), affd, 441 N.E.2d 1070 (N.Y. 1982). But see IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.1-14(a) (West
Supp. 1994) (no award if V had "a net worth of greater than $200,000" at time of injury).
191 See infra Table 2.
192 NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 4, 12-13.
193 A similar survey of six programs (including Pennsylvania and Texas) in 1994 also
produced wide variations. See Note, Strategies and Solutions: Expanding Eligibility and Benefits,
CRIME VICTIM ComP. Q., No. 2, 1994, at 7-12 [hereinafter CVCQ SURVEY].
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the United States as in Great Britain. 194 Claims appear to be most
frequently closed or denied because of (1) the failure by the victim or
claimant to provide the necessary information or otherwise to cooper-
ate with the board; (2) the absence of a "crime of violence;" or (3) the
fact that the claimant has suffered no net loss or a net loss below the
statutory minimum (where the higher figure for Britain clearly re-
flects the comparatively high threshold in the British Scheme).
95
Contributory misconduct is also a frequent cause for denial. But the
table suggests that claims are seldom rejected on the grounds of fail-
ure to make a timely report to the law enforcement authorities or be-
cause of the lack of "serious financial hardship."'
9 6
Table 2: DISTRIBUTION OF CLAIMs DENIED
1 9 7
GB FLA MICH MINN NY PA TEXAS
Failure to supply
information/claim
abandoned 5.2 89.7 24.0 1.2 66.5 8.2 6.1
No crime of violence 12.0 0.8 7.9 8.1 1.7 6.1 16.2
No police report N/A 0.2 3.1 3.1 1.2 0.9 5.4
Failure to cooperate with
Board/law enforcement 20.6 0.79 10.1 5.4 1.7 20.6 26.1
Claimant's conduct 24.2 1.7 9.5 15.6 2.1 14.2 39.0
No physical injury 3.6 1.7 4.2 1.5 N/A N/A
No net loss N/A 0.8 26.3 49.7 13.5 2.1 N/A
No minimum loss 25.2 N/A 11.8 6.4 N/A 8.2 N/A
No serious financial
hardship N/A 0.6 0.0 N/A 0.1 N/A N/A
Other 12.7 1.9 5.6 6.3 11.6 10.5 7.2
Denials as % of all claims
determined 33.7 62.4 58.2 N/A 60.2 20.1 35.3
194 The range revealed in Table 2 (with a median figure of 34.5%) is somewhat higher
than the 17-37% range (median of 25-29%) in the CVCQ SuRvEy, supra note 193, at 12. Cf
Sarnoff, supra note 19, at 138-44 (finding denial rates ranging from 11% to 76%). Infor-
mation supplied by the Office for Victims of Grime in Washington, D.C. (on file in office)
suggests that some 37% of claims nationwide were "not approved" in 1993, comprising
10.7% of claims "not processed" and 26.4% of claims "denied."
195 See infra text accompanying note 237.
196 But see CVCQ SURVEy, supra note 193, at 7:
The most frequent reason for denial or closure in some states was failure on the vic-
tim's part to provide required information to the program to determine the claim; in
some states, this constituted close to 50% of all denials or closures. Contributory con-
duct denials also were significant, ranging from a low of 6% . . . to a high of 39% ...
with an average at 14%. Collateral-source reimbursement precluded about 20% of
laimants from collecting in half our sample states. Interestingly enough, failure to
report to police promptly, and to file a timely claim with the compensation program,
figured in a relatively small number of denials.
Id.'
197 See CRIM NAL INJURIES Comp. BD., 29TH REPORT, 1993, Cmnd. 2421, at 22; FLA. Div. or
VICrIM SERV. AND CUMirNAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 1992-1993 ANNUAL REPORT 16-17 (1993);
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Separate figures are not given for American programs with re-
spect to reduction of compensation, but if the British experience is in-
dicative,' 98 this power is exercised in relatively few cases.
V. ASSESSMENT OF COMPENSATION
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Until 1994, a victim who came within the British Scheme quali-
fied, in principle, for compensation "assessed on the basis of common
law damages."' 99 Therefore, awards were designed to reimburse fi-
nancial losses and expenses in full, and to provide a reasonable sum to
cover the victim's pain and suffering, and loss of amenities. Notwith-
standing frequent use of terms such as "compensation," "indemnifica-
tion," and "restitution," most state programs are less ambitious. Their
objective may be more accurately reflected in the words of the Wiscon-
sin program:
It is the intention of the legislature that the state should provide suffi-
cient assistance to victims of crime and their families in order to ease
their financial burden and to maintain their dignity as they go through a
difficult and often traumatic period.
20 0
All states compensate victims for net lost earnings and medical and
other "reasonable" expenses. Also, if a person has been killed, each
MINN. CRIME VIrIMs REPARATIONS BD., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1993); PA. CRIME VIrIMs
COMP. BD., 1992-93 ANNUAL REPORT 10, 30 (1993); MICH. CRIME VICTIMS CoMP. BD., 1991-
92 ANNUAL REPORT 23-24 (1992); N.Y. CRIME VICTIMS BD., 1991-92 ANNUAL REPORT 12, 17
(1992); OmcE OF THE ATr'Y GEN., supra note 50, at 23.
198 During the period 1984-1992, 2.5% of awards under the BRITISH SCHEME were re-
duced (and 4% abandoned), while 21% were denied. CRIMINAL INJURIES COMP. BD., 28TH
ANNUAL REPORT, 1992, Cmnd. 2122, at 26.
199 BRITISH SCHEME, supra note 10, 1 12. Compensation could not be awarded for puni-
tive damages, id. 14(b), and there was a cap on awards for loss of earnings, id. I 14(a),
with the result that compensation awards were in some cases lower than tort damages. For
further discussion, see GREER, supra note 10, ch. 4. However, under the new "Tariff'
Scheme (if ultimately implemented, see supra note 10), compensation will be determined
according to the nature of the injury suffered by the victim irrespective of the actual finan-
cial loss or pain and suffering. All conceivable injuries have been classified into some 200
categories, and these in turn have been reduced to 25 "tariff" bands ranging from £1000 to
£250,000 ($1500 to $375,000 approximately). See CRIM. INJURIES COMP. 11-16 (1994). For
an explanation of the reasons for and nature of this new approach, see COMPENSATING
VICrIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME: CHANGES TO CRIM. INJURIES COMP. SCHEME, 1993, supra note 10.
200 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 949.001 (West 1983). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.02 (West 1984
& Supp. 1994); N.Y. EXEC LAW § 620 (McKinney Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE § 14-2A-2
(1991). Compare TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 38 ("No amount of money can
erase the tragedy and trauma imposed on [victims of crime]; however, some financial r~e-
dress can be an important first step in helping people begin the often lengthy process of
recovery.") with Lamborn, supra note 124, at 50 ("[L]egislators . . . hesitate to provide
unlimited benefits to victims of crime when victims of work-related injuries receive re-
stricted awards... [under workers' compensation].").
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state provides compensation for loss of financial support and funeral
services for the victim's dependents. But in both cases compensation
is payable only insofar as these-losses and expenses are not met from
other (collateral) sources.20 1 Initial payments may be made on an
"emergency" basis, with final payment at a later date, either in the
form of a lump sum or by way of periodic payments. The detail of the
programs may differ with regard to the precise definition of lost earn-
ings, the scope of medical expenses, and the relatives entitled to com-
pensation for loss of support. But once again, the general principle is
not an issue with respect to such "losses." However, some noteworthy
developments have taken place under the umbrella of "reasonable ex-
penses." Thus, in certain cases, compensation is payable for the cost
of "mental health counselling," and indeed, "[p]erhaps more than
any other single medical expenditure, demand for mental health
counseling benefits has risen dramatically over the past few years."
202
Compensation has also become payable to victims of domestic vio-
lence for the cost of temporary alternative accommodations which en-
able them to avoid contact with the offender.203 The cost of substitute
child care, to replace that which the victim would have provided, may
be paid to enable "the victim [or his or her spouse] ... to engage in
gainful employment."20 4 However, at least one court has drawn the
line against allowing compensation for expense incurred through
post-natal day care services for a child born as the result of a rape.20
5
The first notable point for a British observer 206 is that VOCA
201 For a summary of state programs, see CVCB HANDBOOK, supra note 56, § I. See also
NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, ch. 4; 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b) (1) (1988).
202 CVCB HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at III-2. In 1991, there were "dramatic" increases in
claims for psychiatric treatment in Texas and several other major states. In Texas, the
Attorney General brought proceedings against a private psychiatric hospital chain alleging
use of "bounty hunters" to attract patients and collect fees from the state crime victims
compensation fund; the claim was settled out of court. See, e.g., Louise Kertesz, Hospital
Chain Sues Insurers overMental Care Claims, Bus. INs.,July 27, 1992, at 1, 45. New administra-
tive rules designed to contain medical costs and clarify "unethical and fraudulent prac-
tices" were introduced in 1992 and were reported to have reduced expenditures by $9
million in 1992-1993. See OFFICE OF THE ArT'y GEN., supra note 50, at 3, 22.
203 See supra note 83.
204 See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:1802(8) (b) (iii) (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §611A.52(8)(a)(5) (West Supp. 1994); TEx. CODE CGlM. PROC. ANN., arts.
56.32(8) (A) (iii), 56.42 (a) (4) (C) (Vernon Supp. 1994) (limit varies with number of chil-
drdn: maximum is $125 per week for three or more children).
205 In re Hensley, 579 N.E.2d 557, 557 (Ohio Misc. 1989) (mother was entitled to com-
pensation, however, for prenatal medical care, delivery expenses, and the cost of post-natal
care).
206 As previously explained, until 1994 compensation under the BRITISH SCHEME was
assessed "on the basis of common law damages," thereby entitling victims to compensation
for pain and suffering. See BitR-fsH SCHEME, supra note 10, 12. That will no longer be the
case if the new "Tariff" scheme is implemented, supra note 10, although it has been
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makes no provision for, and in general state programs do not award,
any compensation for pain and suffering.20 7 This may be a matter of
principle, given that the state is not the tortfeasor and, therefore, is
not liable to compensate victims on that basis. But more often the
exclusion of pain and suffering reflects a pragmatic decision to avoid
administrative and assessment difficulties and to keep costs down.
208
This general rule has three exceptions: in certain programs, compen-
sation is payable for pain and suffering though usually subject to a
(relatively low) maximum limit;209 in one state, such compensation is
payable only to victims of rape and crimes involving sexual devi-
ancy;210 and some programs retain elements of earlier linkage to
workers' compensation. These programs provide that permanent par-
tial or total disability qualifies for compensation on a basis that does
not necessarily reflect loss of earnings resulting from that disability.
211
State programs have always stipulated a maximum limit on com-
pensation for losses incurred by victims after deductions for "collat-
claimed that the method of determining the tariff bands "reflects more closely the value of
the pain and suffering element of the award. . . ." COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF VIOLENT
CRIME: CHANGES TO GRIM. INJURIES COMP. SCHEME, supra note 10, 15.
207 See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.51(E) (Baldwin 1993) (Compensation is not
payable for "non-economic detriment" (e.g., pain and suffering, inconvenience, physical
impairment, or other non-pecuniary damage); however, the section adds that "economic
loss may be caused by pain and suffering or physical impairment."). The logical result of
this approach can be seen in Dill v. Commonwealth, 562 N.E.2d 468 (Mass. 1990) (V was
assaulted and left "legally blind"; however, V suffered no net loss of earnings or medical
expenses, and was therefore not entitled to any compensation). KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-
7301 (B) (i) (1992), explains that compensation is payable for economic loss "caused" by
physical impairment or pain and suffering (presumably where this is the direct result of
the injury); and, of course, compensation is payable for the cost of mental health care and
counseling of eligible victims. See supra text accompanying notes 97 to 121.
208 CARROW, supra note 52, at 31-33 (1980); Lamborn, supra note 124, at 34-36.
209 See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 351-62(b) (1985 & Supp. 6 1992) (subject only to overall
limit of $10,000); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 12-25-5(c) (1993) (apparently subject only to overall
limit of $25,000); see also R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-25-6(b) (1981 & Supp. 1993) (authorizing the
Board to take into account the amount of funds available and the number of claims pend-
ing); see generallyJones v. Rhode Island 495 A.2d 224 (R.I. 1985) (upholding an award of
$950 for pain and suffering on appeal); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 34, § 163(b)(3)(B) (1992)
(compensating up to $5000 for "pain and suffering"). At least two programs have recently
repealed similar provisions. W. VA. CODE, § 14-2A-14(g) (repealed 1992) (compensated up
to $15,000 to victim for "emotional distress and/or pain and suffering" and up to $5000 to
the spouse and children of a deceased victim for "sorrow, mental anguish, and solace");
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9005(1) (repealed 1992) (compensation (subject to overall limit
of $25,000) payable for "any scarring, disfigurement, or mental suffering, resulting from
injuries of a permanent nature provided that such scarring, disfigurement, or mental suf-
fering are a direct result of such crime").
210 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-107(3) (Supp. 1994) (subject to maximum of
$3000 and "taking into account the particular circumstances involved in such crime").
211 Id. § 29-13-107(1) (based on current workers' compensation schedule). See also
WASH. Rxv. CODE ANN. § 7.68.070(13) & (14) (West Supp. 1994) (subject to maxima of
$15,000 and $40,000 respectively).
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eral" benefits.212 Table 3 compares the position in 1993 to the
position in 1983.213 However, the programs do not readily lend them-
selves to such tabulation. The maximum limit is normally for all
claims arising out of the crime, but occasionally it is applicable only to
each claimant.214 Similarly, a number of programs now have separate
maxima for death and injury.215 Finally, many programs have individ-
ual limits for certain types of compensation-such as loss of earn-
ings216 and medical expenses2 17-which may operate separately, or
within the overall maximum.218 Nonetheless, Table 3 gives some indi-
cation of the general maximum level of compensation.
Table 3: MAXIMUM COMPENSATION PAYABLE IN STATE PROGRAMS
1993 1983
$50,000 and over 4219 1
$26,000 - $49,000 6220 3
$25,000 16221 7
$11,000 - $24,000 7222 8
$10,000 16223 12
Under $10,000 3224 2
52 33
212 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.11:1(F) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1994); In re Ed-
mundson, 625 P.2d 372, 377 (Haw. 1981).
213 Based on NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 29, but amended to make data more up to
date. The figures for 1983 are taken from McGiLLiS & SMITH, supra note 1, at 17-18 (Ex-
hibit 1.4).
214 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAr. § 81-1823 (Supp. 1992) ($10,000 "for each applicant per
incident") as applied in, Lambert v. Nebraska Crime Victims Reparations Bd., 336 N.W.2d
320 (Neb. 1983) (awarding $10,000 to each of two children). See also N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-M:8-h(V) (Supp. 1993) ($5000 "per claimant per incident"); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 34,
§ 164(a) (1992) ($25,000 "to any one applicant").
215 See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 18.67.130(c) (1991) ($25,000 per victim, but $40,000 if V
dies leaving more than one dependent); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-211(d) (West Supp.
1994) (General limit $15,000, but up to $25,000 payable to dependents of homicide vic-
tim); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46.1810(A) (West Supp. 1994) (Limit is $10,000 "except for
those victims who are permanently, totally, or permanently and totally disabled as a result
of the crime, [when] the aggregate award shall not exceed $25,000").
216 A maximum limit for earnings may be fixed by dollar amounts, see, e.g., N.Y. ExEc..
LAW § 631(3) (McKinney Supp. 1994) ($400 per week "provided ... that the aggregate
award for such loss shall not exceed twenty-thousand dollars"), or be expressed as a per-
centage (or fraction) of the victim's earnings or of state average weekly earnings (some-
times as determined for workers' compensation purposes), or both. See, e.g., MONT. CODE
ANN. § 53-9-128 (1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.9(c) (1990 & Supp. 1994); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 63-63-14(4)(d) (1993).
217 This is particularly noticeable with regard to awards for the cost of mental health
care and counseling where the individual limit may be as low as $500 in a program with an
overall limit of $15,000 or $25,000. See supra text accompanying note 120.
218 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 912.6 (West 1994 & Supp. 1994), which does not stipulate
any general maximum, but lays down limits for seven types of particular losses or expenses.
For a list of individual limits by state, see Sarnoff, supra note 19, at 133.
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To a British observer, these maxima might seem comparatively
219 New York does not limit the compensation payable for "indebtedness reasonably in-
curred for medical . . . services necessary as a result of the injury .... N.Y. EXEC.. LAW
§ 631 (2) (McKinney Supp. 1994). However, it does limit the other heads of compensation.
Indeed, these limits have recently been reduced. The maximum that can now be awarded
for loss of earnings or loss of support is $20,000, reduced from $30,000 in 1991. See gener-
ally N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 631 (McKinney Supp. 1994); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68.070(13)
(West Supp. 1994) (benefits not exceeding $40,000 may be granted for total permanent
disability or death); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.68.085 (West 1992) (medical benefits sub-
ject to a "cap" of $150,000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.54(3) (West Supp. 1994) ($50,000);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.60(I) (Baldwin 1993) ($50,000).
220 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13965(f) (West Supp. 1994) ($46,000). Until 1993, a further
$10,000 could be paid under subd. (i) "to or on behalf of a victim of a crime involving
sexual assault... who has made more than two appearances in open court... in criminal
actions involving the defendant, over an extended period of time." See also MO. CODE ANN.
art. 26A, § 12(2) (Supp. 1993) ($45,000); ALAsKA STAT. § 18.67.130(c) (1992) ($40,000
only when the victim is killed); Wis. STAr. ANN. § 949.06(2) (West Supp. 1993) ($40,000);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.9(b) (1990 & Supp. 1994) ($35,000); W. VA. CODE § 14-2A-
14(g) (Supp. 1994) ($30,000 when victim dies, otherwise maximum is $20,000).
221 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-211 (d) (West Supp. 1994) (only where victim dies); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9007(d) (1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-403(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 72-
1019(5)(a) (Supp. 1994); 740 ILCS 45/10.1(f) (Michie 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-
7305(i) (1992 & Supp. 1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 346.130(6) (Baldwin 1993); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 46.1810(A) (West Supp. 1994) (but only where V is "permanently, totally, or
permanently and totally disabled as a result of the crime"); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 258A, § 5
(Law. Co-op. 1994) (repealed 1995); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 258C, § 3 (Law. Co-op. 1995)
(retains maximum of $25,000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-128(5) (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:4B-18 (West Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-23.4-06(8) (1993); R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 12-25-6(b) (1981 & Supp. 1993); TEX. CraM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 56.42(b) (West 1994);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-63-14(6) (1993) (reduced from $50,000 in 1993, see NIJ SUMMARY,
supra note 213); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 34, § 164(a) (1992) (but limit applies "to any one
applicant"); see supra note 214.
222 IOWA CODE ANN. § 912.6 (1994) (approximately $22,600, see supra note 218); MICH.
COMP. LAWs ANN. § 18.361(1) (West 1994) ($15,000 "per claimant"); NET. Rxv. STAT. ANN.
§ 217.200(3) (Michie 1992) ($15,000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-11(g) (Supp. 1993) ($20,000
"in addition to allowable funeral, cremation, and burial expenses"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-
22-14B (Michie 1994) ($20,000); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.035 (2) (b) (1993) ($23,000); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.11:1(F) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1994) ($15,000).
223 ALA. CODE § 15-23-15(b) (1994); ARiz. COMP. ADMIN. R. & REGs. R10-4-108(D)(1)
(1990); ARE. CODE ANN. § 16-90-716(a) (Michie Supp. 1993); COLO. Rxv. STAT. § 24-4.1-
109(2) (b) (1988 & Supp. 1993) ("unless otherwise determined by the... Board to address
situations catastrophic to the victim," when limit is $15,000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.13(8)
(West Supp. 1994); HAw. REv. STAT. § 351-62(b) (1985 & Supp. 6 1992); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 5-2-6.1-35(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-41-23(2) (1994); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 595.030.6 (Vernon Supp. 1994); NEB. Rxv. STAT. § 81-1823 (1992) ("for each appli-
cant per incident" an award may exceed $10,000 where "expenses for job retraining or
similar.., rehabilitative services for the victim are deemed necessary"); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 142.13(B) (West Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1180(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-28B-21 (Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-
106(e) (Supp. 1994) (provided sufficient funds); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5356 (Supp.
1993); Wvo. STAT. § 1-40-109(b) (1988). See infra note 231.
224 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-8(c)(1) (1994) ($5000 as of July 1994, previous limit was
$1000); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3360-E (West Supp. 1993) ($5000); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANr. § 21-M:8-h(V) (Supp. 1993) ($5000 for each claimant per incident). See supra note
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low-the British Board has made awards in excess of $750,000.225
However, only 5.5% of awards under the British Scheme in 1992-1993
were for $15,000 or above, and the average award was about $6250.226
The average awards in the United States appear to range from $1000
or less to more than $8000, with a nationwide average of $2084 in
1993.227 It is not known how many maximum awards are made over-
all. Connecticut's maxima of $25,000 for death and $15,000 for injury
are fairly typical and it gives the maximum about ten percent of the
time.
2 28
Awards under many programs are also subject to the availability
of funds, thereby limiting the victim's "right" to compensation.
229
When a Board assesses the amount of compensation, the statute may
require it take available funds into account. 230 Boards are frequently
authorized to "prorate" awards or to make "appropriate proportionate
reductions" if they find or anticipate that sufficient funds are not avail-
214.
225 Four such awards were made in 1992-1993. CRIMINAL INJURIES ComP. BD., 29TH AN-
NUAL REPORT,'1993, Cmnd. 2421, at 5 (11 taken to be worth $1.50). However, under the
new "Tariff" Scheme the maximum award (for quadriplegia/tetraplegia or permanent and
extremely serious brain damage) will be $375,000. See COMPENSATING VIcTrIMs OF VIOLENT
CRIME, supra note 10, at 11.
226 Id. 273 awards (i.e., 0.7% of the total number) exceeded $75,000 (over £50,000);
31,625 (86%) were for less than $7500 (X5000).
227 Samoff, supra note 19, at 145-46 (average award ranges from $695 to $8800). Cf
CVCB Handbook, supra note 56, at X-1 (range is from $1000 to $5000). See e.g., PA. CRIME
VICTIMS CoMP. Bo., 1992-1993 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (approx. $2245); FLA. Dwy. OF VIc-Im
SERV. AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS: 1992-1993 ANNUAL REPORT 18 ($3559); OFFICE OF
THE ATr'y GEN., supra note 50, at 11 ($3867); COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO, 1992-1993 AN-
NUAL REPORT 2 ($2694); STATE OF MICH. CRIME VICTIMS COMP. BD., 1991-1992 ANNUAL'
REPORT 11 ($2260). The nationwide figure was supplied by the Office for Victims of Crime
(on file).
228 CONN. COMM'N ON VICTIM SERVICES, 13TH ANNUAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT 1990-1991, at
10 (1992). Compare with NewJersey, where the limit is $25,000, the corresponding figure
was 2.6%. NJ. VIOLENT CRIMES COMP. BD., 1989-1990 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1991). CVCB
HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at X-1 estimates that "less than 5% of awards will reach the
maximum." Cf John H. Laub, Patterns of Criminal Viwtimization in the U.S., in Vic(riMs OF
CRIME: PROBLEMS, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 23, 42 (ArthurJ. Lurigio et al. eds., 1990) (just
over 16% of victims suffering personal injury as a result of crime receive "serious" injuries).
According to CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1992, at 68 (1994), "about
8%" of victims of violent crime received hospital care, and the same percentage lost time
from work.
229 See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 595.035(1) (Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-
28B-10 (Supp. 1994); TExAS GRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 56.54(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-9 (West Supp. 1994). The court in White v. Violent Crimes Comp. Bd.,
388 A.2d 206, 214 n.3 (N.J. 1978), held that "there [was] no 'excess' liability on the part of
the public treasury for valid claims which cannot be paid because of insufficient funding."
Id.
230 See e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3360-F(3) (West Supp. 1993) (Board to consider
the amount available to pay claims and the number and amount of currently pending
claims).,
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able. 231 Alternatively, they may establish an order of priority for the
payment of compensation:
Payment to treatment providers may be deferred until the payment of
economic loss is complete. Funds available after payment to the appli-
cant for economic loss shall be equitably distributed among all ... eligi-
ble treatment providers.232
In such cases, "topping-up" payments cannot usually be made unless
and until the legislature specifically makes the necessary arrange-
ments. 233 Occasionally there is a complete embargo where "no fur-
ther awards... shall be made until sufficient funds are available. 234
In recent years, many programs have availed themselves of such provi-
sions and suspended or reduced awards otherwise payable to
victims.
2 35
It comes as no surprise to find that many programs have a mini-
mum as well as a maximum level of compensation-normally $100-
$200236 or two-to-three weeks' loss of earnings or both. Sometimes
this minimum is stated as a threshold; in other cases it operates as a
deductible. These minima are low by British standards-the lower
limit under the British Scheme is now $1500.237 Also, many programs
231 See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 595.045(10) (Supp. 1994); MINN. R. § 7505.3000 (1992) (re-
pealed); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-108 (1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.125(2) (1993); S.C.
CODE ANN., § 16-3-1330 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). Cf TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-106(h)
(Supp. 1993) (Board may pay an additional sum of up to $3000 by way of "supplemental
award" (for losses exceeding $7000), but only if sufficient funds available).
232 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2A-2.010 (1992) (proposed to "conserve and efficiently
manage the distribution of the limited funds available"). TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 1, § 61.14
(1992) contains a similar provision.
23- See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-108 (1993). When sufficient funds do become
available, full awards may have to be made "in chronological order." ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
90-712(7) (Michie Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 595.045(10) (Supp. 1994).
234 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5356 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-403(a) (1994); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15B-22 (1993).
235 In California, a funding deficit caused payment of compensation to be suspended in
1993. Note, California Gets $44 Million to Cover Deficit; CRIME VICTIM COMP. Q., 1994, No. 1,
at 3. In Maryland, budget cuts forced (temporary) "shutdown" of Board in 1991. Note,
Victims Aid Board Cut in Budget Woes, WASHINGTON TIMEs, Dec. 9, 1991 at B2. The New
Jersey Board would not pay more than 75% of medical expenses or loss of earnings (later
restored to 100%). See Resolving a Fiscal Crisis, CRIME VICTIM COMP. Q., No. 4 1992, at 9. In
Texas, medical payments were temporarily reduced by 40%. See Texas Restores 100% Bene-
fit, CRIME VicriM COMP. Q., No. 1, 1994, at 3. A survey by the National Association of
Crime Victim Compensation Boards in 1992 suggested that 35 state programs were suffer-
ing "some degree of financial difficulty, ranging from a cessation of payments for months
at a time, to a negative cash flow eating into reserves." Association Backs VOCA Changes,
CRIME VICTIM COMP. Q., No. 4, 1992, at 1.
236 NU SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 30. Note also that the financial needs/hardship test
may operate as "a floating lower limit tied to the resources of the individual" victim. Lam-
born, supra note 124, at 53.
237 BRITISH SCHEME, supra note 10, 5 (£1000). This figure has been criticized as being
too high. See GREER, supra note 10, at 95-96; MIERS, supra note 10, at 69-70. A particular
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provide that the minimum does not apply to claims by certain classes
of victims, such as the elderly, the previously disabled, victims of sex-
ual offenses, or even cases in which "it is determined that the interest
of justice would not be served by such a limitation."
238
Predictably, Table 4 suggests that the money is spent "primarily
on medical expenses." The most notable figure is the high expendi-
ture on psychotherapy expenses in California-an apparent result of
both the large number of child abuse claims and that program's gen-
erous provisions for secondary victims.
2 39
Table 4: DISTRIBUTION OF COMPENSATION AwARDS
2 4 0
CALIF MINN NY TEXAS OTHERS ALL
Medical expenses 44.3 53.0 47.0 67.7 61 47.7
Mental health care 38.3 12.2 5.5 13 18.9
Loss of income/support 17.3 23.0 27.1 17.4 15 19.7
Funeral expenses - 11.8 14.8 8.9 9 8.1
Other 0.1 - 11.0 0.6 2 5.6
B. COLLATERAL BENEFITS
From the outset, criminal injuries programs have, as in Britain,
adopted a policy against double compensation, so that a victim does
not obtain compensation from the program in addition to financial
assistance from social security, insurance, and other sources:
To make the restitution fund meaningful, it must be limited to compen-
sating financial losses not offset by support payments which would not
have been received except for the criminal act.2 41
concern is that this threshold will preclude the payment of compensation to the archetypal
victim-the "little old lady" who is mugged in the street. But the Board has stressed that it
will consider such claims sympathetically. See GREER, supra note 10, at 96.
238 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-106(d) (Supp. 1993). See, e.g., CAL GOV'T CODE.
§ 13960(d)(3) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWs § 18.354(3) (1994); Miss.
CODE AN. § 9941-17(1)(f) (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-18 (West Supp. 1994).
239 See supra text accompanying notes 77 and 108, respectively.
240 CAL. STATE BD. OF CONTROL, supra note 50, at 32; MINN. CRIME VcTiMS REPARATIONS
BD., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1994); N.Y. CRIME VICTIMS BD., 1991-1992 ANNUAL REPORT 22
(1992); OFCE OF THE ATr'Y GEN., supra note 50, at 14. "Others" refers to a survey of 7
states in Note, Percentage of Payments by Type of Expense CRIME VICTIM COMP. Q. No. 2, 1994,
at 12, and "All" refers to a survey of 49 programs in 1993 (information on file supplied by
Office for Victims of Crime). The British Board does not give such information, but it may
be assumed that because of the National Health Service much less is payable in Britain by
way of medical expenses. In contrast, a substantial percentage of compensation represents
payments for pain and suffering.
241 Fierro v. State Bd. of Control, 236 Cal. Rptr. 516, 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). In
County of Alameda v. State Bd. of Control, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 487, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993),
review denied, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 3382 (1993), a compensation program was described as "a
source of last resort" Occasional exceptions may be found. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE.
§ 7.68.050(1) (1992) (V "may elect to seek damages [from 0] ... and such victim ... is
1994]
DESMOND S. GREER [Vol. 85
Of the various sources available to the victim, criminal injuries com-
pensation is primary in two senses: First, social security authorities,
insurance companies, and others who have made payments to the vic-
tim are normally not entitled to recover those sums under the pro-
gram; second, victims who have been paid or who are entitled to be
paid from a collateral source will generally have their compensation
claims reduced accordingly. This is not always the case, however, and
some recent decisions have given rise to concern that compensation
programs are not sufficiently recognized as "payors of last resort."242
The usual provision for the deduction of collateral benefits is de-
rived from the Uniform Crime Victims Reparations Act of 1973:
'Collateral source' means a source of benefits or advantages for eco-
nomic loss otherwise reparable under [this Act] which the victim or
claimant2 43 has received, or which is readily available to the victim, from:
(1) the offender;
2 4 4
entitled to the full compensation ... provided by this chapter regardless of any election or
recovery made pursuant to this section"); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 18.361 (4) (c) (1994) (disa-
bility or death benefits paid to peace officer or corrections officer on account of injuries
sustained in the course of employment not deducted); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.9(e)
(Supp. 1994) (collateral payments deducted "except for any payments or proceeds that are
specifically denominated as compensation for dismemberment or loss of an eye").
242 Compare United States v. Maryland, 914 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1990) and United States v.
Ohio, 957 F.2d 231 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 75 (1992) (federal statute granting
Veterans' Administration right to recover cost of medical care from third party preempts
state statute denying compensation to crime victim who receives "free" care at VA hospital)
with County of Alameda v. State Bd. of Control, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(indigent V who received "free" treatment at County hospital suffered no loss and there-
fore not entitled to compensation). In 1990, "state Medicaid programs were instructed by
federal authorities that under federal law, victim compensation was the primary payor...
for Medicaid-eligible victims." CVCB HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at VII-3. The Office for
Victims of Crime has called for legislation "to unequivocally designate the VOCA victim
compensation program as the payor of last resort." 1994 VOCA REPORT, supra note 8, at
27. This recommendation has now been implemented by the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 10601, et seq. (1994) (state compensation pro-
gram not to pay "costs that a Federal program, or a federally financed State or local pro-
gram, would otherwise pay.").
243 Each claimant must be separately considered, so that the compensation payable, e.g.,
to the daughter of a victim, is not to be reduced by collateral benefits paid to her mother.
"The statute plainly does not intend that payment from a collateral source to a claimant
who may have no legal obligation to provide assistance to other dependents of the crime
victim will preclude an award to other claimants." Jennings v. Division of Crime Victims
Comp. Fund, 365 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Va. Ct. App. 1988). But what if CI does have a legal
obligation to assist C2?
244 Many states add "anyone paying on behalf of the offender." See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.
§ 5-2-6.1-32(2) (Burns 1994); MI.H. COMP. LAws § 18.361(4) (a) (1994); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-13-106(f) (1) (a) (1994). But even this addition does not appear to catch a third party
tortfeasor (e.g., the negligent innkeeper or landlord). Compare 1992 UNIFORM Ac(r, supra
note 2, § 316(a) (referring to "the person responsible or any other public or private alter-
native source." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.06(3) (e) (West 1993) expressly deducts any payment
received, or to be received, from "one or more third parties held liable for the offender's
acts." And, indeed, in most programs the Board is entitled to subrogation to "any" right
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(2) the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, a state
or any of its political subdivisions, 245 or an instrumentality of two or
more states, unless the law providing for the benefits or advantages
makes them excess or secondary to benefits under [this Act];
(3) Social Security, 246 Medicare and Medicaid;
247
(4) state required temporary non-occupational disability insurance;
(5) workers' compensation;
(6) wage continuation programs of any employer;
248
(7) proceeds of a contract of insurance payable to the victim for eco-
nomic loss sustained because of the crime;
249
(8) a contract providing prepaid hospital and other health care services,
or benefits for disability;
(9) any private25 ° source as a voluntary donation or gift.
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which V may have to recover losses arising from the crime. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 960.16 (West 1993); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 18.364 (1994). Seefurther infra text accompany-
ing notes 269 to 279.
245 This general wording appears to include a provision which is made explicit in some
programs: that any sum received by the victim under the criminal injuries compensation
scheme of another state or foreign country will be deducted. See, e.g., OHio REV. CODE
ANN. § 2743.51(B) (10) (Baldwin 1993), as applied in In re Cooper, 593 N.E.2d 506, 508
(Ohio Ct. Cl. 1990).
246 It is not always clear whether this means all such benefits or only those intended to
replace lost income. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 595.035(4) (1994) (monthly social security
disability and retirement benefits not deducted). Compare Scott v. Labor and Indus. Rela-
tions Comm'n, 757 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) with Jennings v. Division of Crime
Victims Comp., 365 S.E.2d 241 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
247 But see supra note 242.
248 But see MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.54 (West 1994) ("No employer may deny an em-
ployee an award of benefits based on the employee's eligibility or potential eligibility for
[criminal injuries compensation] .... ").
249 Apparently this category includes vehicle, commercial, and residential insurance.
See, e.g., CAL. VICrIMs OF CRIME REGS. r. 649 and FLA. STAT ANN. § 960.13(2) (West 1993).
All or some of the proceeds of life insurance are sometimes ignored. See, e.g., MmNN. STAT.
ANN. § 611A-52(5) (West 1994) (ignored altogether); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-106(0(2)
(1993) (same); 740 ILCS 45/10.1(e) (Michie 1993) (proceeds in excess of $25,000 ig-
nored); W. VA. CODE § 14-2A-3(b)(9) (1994) (proceeds under $25,000 ignored); OHio
REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.51 (B) (9) (Baldwin 1993) (proceeds in excess of $50,000 de-
ducted). "Some programs have implemented administrative policies whereby life insur-
ance is not considered a collateral resource unless the claimant's dependents received
proceeds earmarked for funeral and burial costs." CVCB HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at VII-
3. Note also that the proceeds of life insurance may be taken into account in determining
whether a claimant will suffer "serious financial hardship" if not awarded compensation.
Id.
250 Financial assistance from family members, private persons or from private charitable
organizations is not deducted. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-8(0 (2) (1994). Cf, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-22-3(B) (8) (1994) (deducts "cash donations" apparently of any kind).
251 1973 UNIFORM Aar, supra note 2, § 1(d), as enacted in Mn N. STAT. ANN. § 61 1A.52,
subd. 5(9) (West 1994). The 1992 UNIFORM Acr, supra note 2, § 316(a), prefers the gen-
era!I formula quoted supra note 244. The other common provision-which has much the
same effect-requires the deduction of "any payments received or to be received... (a)
from or on behalf of the person who committed the crime; (b) under insurance programs
mandated by law; (c) from public funds, and (d) under any contract of insurance wherein
the claimant is the insured or beneficiary...." See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 631(4) (McKin-
1994]
DESMOND S. GREER[
It is, of course, a truism that state programs are required in the
first place because the offenders who will be paying the damages
either cannot be found or are impecunious. During the past decade,
however, both the United States and Great Britain have made vigor-
ous attempts to make the offender pay, by imposing "restitution" or
"compensation" orders on them when they are convicted of the of-
fense.2 52 Thus, the Task Force on Victims of Crime recommended
that courts should order offenders to make restitution to the victim in
all cases "unless the court provides specific reasons for failing to re-
quire it."253 As a result, the Victim and Witnes& Protection Act of 1982
provided that federal courts should order the payment of restitution
to the victim "in addition to or in lieu of any other penalty." or state on
the record why it has not done so. 254 Most state legislatures have fol-
lowed suit in one form or another. But conflicting objectives (punish-
ment or rehabilitation of the offender versus compensation of the
victim),255 procedural weaknesses, 256 and the obstinate fact that, de-
spite various schemes,257 offenders generally still lack the necessary
ney 1994). CVCB HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at section VII provides a useful survey of
"collateral resources" and comments, at VII-6, that a "thorough familiarity with [such] re-
sources... is essential if programs are to ... spend funds wisely... [and] victims [are to]
be directed toward those programs that, in the long run, will provide them with the best
financial assistance for their needs."
252 See, e.g., Susan Hillenbrand, Restitution and Victim Rights in the 1980s, in VICTIMS OF
CRIME: PROBLEMS, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 188 (Arthur J. Lurigio et al. eds., 1990); A.R.
KLEIN, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING--A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE ch. 5 (1988); DANIEL McGILLIS,
CRIME VICTIM RESTITUTION: AN ANALYSIS OF APPROACHES (1986). For a summary of devel-
opments in Great Britain, see GREER, supra note 10, at 167-87 and MIERS, supra note 10, chs.
10-11 and pp. 316-24.
253 TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 18.
254 18 U.S.C. §3251 (1988). See, e.g., Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990). The
English courts were given a similar power in 1972. See Criminal Justice Act §§ 1-5 (1972),
re-enacted in Powers of Criminal Courts Act §§ 35-38 (1973) (as amended).
255 Compare People v. Frey, 256 Cal. Rptr. 810, 812 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (additional
means of punishing 0) and People v. Williams, 255 Cal. Rptr. 778, 780 (Ct. App. 1989)
(rehabilitation of 0), with People v. Rivera, 261 Cal. Rptr. 93, 95 (Ct. App. 1989) (purpose
is to compensate V) and People v. Beck, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250, 254 (Ct. App.), review denied,
1993 Cal. LEXIS 5428 (1993) (restitution compensates V for economic loss).
256 For a variety of reasons, federal courts have, since 1982, "generally imposed [restitu-
tion] in less than half of the sentences for the types of crimes in which it would have been
appropriate." Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Restitution in the Federal CriminalJustice System, 77JUDI-
CATURE 90, 95 (1993). Ensuring that restitution payments are actually made is another
problem. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURTS, BRINGING CRIMINAL DEBT INTO
BALANCE: IMPROVING FINE AND REsrrrtrION COLLECTION (1992). The inauguration of the
National Fine Center is intended to provide an effective response to problems of compli-
ance and enforcement. Id.
257 E.g., deductions from "earnings" paid to prison inmates. State v. Wagner, 484
N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (0 was ordered to pay 25% of his monthly pris-
oner's pay of $7.20; since the restitution to be paid amounted to $109,000, the court itself
calculated that it would take 0 some 5046 years to do so).
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means, have meant that "even the most successful programs are able
to recoup losses for relatively few victims.1 25 However, American pro-
grams have been more successful in recouping the cost of compensat-
ing victims from offenders collectively.
Normally, the statutes require the Board to reduce the victim's
compensation by the sums which the victim has already received or
will receive from any of the stipulated sources.25 9 The Board is also
empowered to recoup any payment from a collateral source not taken
into account in the making of an award because it was made after com-
pensation had been awarded.2 60 Conversely, when the Board deducts
an expected collateral payment which the victim does not receive, the
Board may have to reconsider the case.
2 61
There is some disagreement on the question of the victim's re-
sponsibility to pursue collateral sources. The majority position ap-
pears to be that victims should take "reasonable steps" to recover such
benefits before their criminal injuries claim is settled. If they do not
take the necessary steps, the Board may deduct the value (as calcu-
lated by the Board) from their compensation "to the extent that it is
reasonable to do so."262 Some programs take a somewhat tougher
line and make the appropriate deduction if the victim did not pursue
recovery against available collateral sources.2 63 Others are less
demanding:
[The Board] shall not require any claimant to seek or accept any collat-
eral source contribution, unless the claimant was receiving or was enti-
258 Hillenbrand, supra note 252, at 195 (observing that "if the sole aim is to reimburse
victims, the cost of staffing and running [restitution] programs relative to the funds col-
lected might suggest that public monies would better be provided directly to crime victims
259 See, e.g., OHro REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.60(D) (Baldwin 1993).
260 See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-h(v) (1993). See also infra text accompanying
notes 269 et seq.
261 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-11(d) (1993); W. VA. CODE § 14-2A-14(f) (1993)
262 See, e.g., MmmI. STAT. ANN. § 611A.54(1) (West 1994); OHio REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2743.60(H) (Baldwin 1993). Two Ohio cases illustrate the application of this rule. In In
re Hanratty, 579 N.E.2d 306 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1989), V was admitted to a local hospital after an
assault. His medical insurance did not cover treatment in that particular hospital, but V
did not fail to obtain a "readily available collateral source" by moving hospitals: "once in a
place where treatment was being rendered and where he was told he should remain until
his condition stabilized, the applicant should not be expected to defy medical advice .... "
Id. at 306. In In re Schroepfer, 448 N.E.2d 528 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1983), however, where a V
knew that he was entitled to Medicaid benefits, but simply failed to apply for them within
the applicable time-limit, the court deducted the value of the benefits. "It was the [appli-
cant's] duty to recover from that collateral source, and he has no right to an award of
reparations to the extent of his failure to secure those benefits." Id. at 533.
265 IND. CODE AN t. § 5-2-6.1-32(c) (Burns 1994). See also 740 ILCS 45/10.1(g) (Michie




tled to receive such benefits prior to the [crime] ...; provided, however,
no applicant shall be denied compensation solely because such appli-
cant is entitled to income from a collateral source.
264
Certain states specifically require victims to claim restitution from
the offender: "No award may be made unless the board.., finds that:
. .. the applicant has pursued restitution rights against any person
who committed the crime unless the board ... determines that such
action would not be feasible. '265 Alternatively, the Board may be em-
powered to take direct action by initiating restitution hearings itself or
intervening therein.
26 6
Since victims may need prompt financial assistance, compensa-
tion programs come under pressure to make the initial payments, to
be recouped later from collateral sources:
Most states ... reported that they pay qualified victims and commence
subrogation procedures to recover a portion of any future settlements
from insurance claims, civil suits or restitution. This enables the victim
to be fully compensated (within the limits set by the program) without
having to wait months, or even years, for civil litigation to conclude or
restitution to be completed. However, it required the program to wait
for months or years for revenues, if any, it may recoup .... And, of
course, the state bears an added risk, since there is always the chance a
civil case will never be settled .... 267
Boards can reduce some of these problems by making the victim an
"emergency" award, rather than a final award. Most programs em-
power boards to do this, albeit with limits ranging from $100 to
$5000-although, occasionally they may make unlimited emergency
awards.
268
When a board does not take a payment from a collateral source
into account when it awards compensation, and that payment is made
or becomes due at a later date, the Board is usually269 entitled2 70 to
264 ALA. CODE. § 15-23-9 (1993). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-90-714(d) (Michie 1993);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142.7 (West 1994).
265 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-8(a) (4) (1994).
266 See ALA. CODE §15-23-14(c) & (d) (1993).
267 NIJ SuMMARY, supra note 36, at 30. "Across all programs subrogation accounts for
less than one percent of total program revenues." Id.
268 Id.
269 But see State v. Livingston, 592 So. 2d 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), in which the
court awarded compensation of $10,000 and V later settled a tort claim under uninsured
motorist coverage for $165,000. The court held that the Board was not entitled to reim-
bursement from the settlement because the damages did not constitute "payment of the
same expenses" for which the compensation had been awarded and V's injuries "far ex-
ceed both payments." Id. at 763. The Florida statute was amended in 1992 to include
subrogation to any claim which V might have "under any insurance provision, including an
uninsured motorists provision." FiA. STAT. ANN. § 960.16 (West 1993). Compare with State
of Nevada Victims of Crime Fund v. Barry, 792 P.2d 26 (Nev. 1990), where V was awarded
compensation of $15,000 and later settled a tort claim for $540,000. The Board was held
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reimbursement up to the amount of the compensation paid. This
right may take one or more of five forms: (a) assignment of the claim-
ant's right to recover from the collateral source; 271 (b) subrogation of
the Board to the claimant's right to receive such payments;
272 (c)
where a person is convicted of the crime for which compensation was
paid, authorization for the state to bring civil proceedings against the
offender for recovery of all or part of the compensation;273 (d) a re-
quirement that the collateral source make the payments directly to
the program; 274 or (e) an undertaking by, or obligation by way of lien
or trust imposed upon, the victim to reimburse the Board for such
payments. 275 To improve the Board's chances of recovery, programs
often reqfuire claimants to give the Board written notice of the addi-
tional payment or their intention to claim it, and to cooperate fully
with the Board.276 Alternatively, the statute may require a claimant to
bring the proceedings "as a trustee on behalf of the state to recover
reparations awarded," or the Board may 'join in the action as a party
entitled to full reimbursement from the damages, without any deduction for V's time, risk
or expense in pursuing the tort claim. See further infra note 279.
270 But the Board is not usually obliged to do so. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13,
§ 13:75-1.26(b) (1993) (the Board may (i) take prompt action to seek reimbursement, (ii)
reserve its position until V's action has been completed, or (iii) waive its rights).
271 See, e.g., MINN. R. 7505.0700 (1992) (assignment of V's right to recover "from any
source which is, or if readily available... would be, a collateral source"); N.J. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 13, § 13:75-1.26(b) (2) (1993) (Board may require claimant to execute an assignment to
the Board for the amount of the compensation); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-63-22(1) (1993)
(acceptance of award by V automatically assigns to the state all claims against any third
party up to the amount paid to the victim by the state).
272 ALA. CODE § 15-23-14(a) (1993); see also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13966.01(a) (Deering
1994); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.51 (West 1994). In Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.15(1)
(West 1993) (reversing the decision in Hamed v. Milwaukee County, 321 N.W.2d 199 (Wis.
1982) (O's employer was not "the person responsible" for V's injury), the right of subroga-
tion expressly included "the cause of action of the claimant against one or more third
parties liable for the acts of the person responsible for the injury or death." This provision
now states simply that the Board is subrogated "to the rights of the claimant..." Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 949.15(1) (West Supp. 1994). In D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-406(b) (1994) subroga-
tion is limited to "the claimant's right against the offender .... " Id. See also Hulsey v.
Commonwealth Crime Victims Comp. Bd., 628 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (Board
subrogated to V's right to workers' compensation).
273 See, e.g., ARY. CODE ANN. § 16-90-715(a) (Michie 1993).
274 See; e.g., Nav. REv. STAT. ANN. § 217.180(2) (Michie 1992).
275 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-23-14(b) (1993) (collateral payment received byV as trustee
for Board and to be paid "promptly" to Board); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13966.01(b) (Deering
1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.1-23 (Bums 1993) (state entitled to lien in amount of award
on any recovery by V).
276 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13966.01(d) (Deering 1994); FLA. CRIM. INJURIES COMP.
R. 2A-2.012; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.56(1) (b) (West 1994). Quite often, such an assign-
ment or subrogation agreement is a condition of receipt of an award. See, e.g., TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-13-109(e) (1993) (no compensation paid until subrogation agreement executed
by V). In Texas, failure to notify filing of a suit to recover damages "will be just cause for
reconsideration of the award." Tax. ADMIN. CODE tit. 1, § 61.19 (1992).
1994]
DESMOND S. GREER
plaintiff.... "277 The Board may also encourage the claimant to bring
proceedings directly2 78 or indirectly.
279
It is difficult to estimate the impact of the general deduction of
collateral benefits on the cost of criminal injuries compensation. On
the one hand, it has been estimated that private medical insurance or
a public medical assistance program covered about two-thirds of vio-
lent crime victims. 280 Subject to coverage restrictions and deductibles
(which may now be substantial), such victims may incur minimal med-
ical expenses, and thus make no claim (or only a substantially reduced
claim) for compensation. Similarly, many victims will suffer little or
no net loss of earnings by reason of access to collateral sources or
wage continuation schemes. On the other hand, it appears that the
cost of compensation is not significantly reduced by the offenders
themselves or by tortfeasors:
All awards made by compensation programs to victims are potentially
recoverable. In an ideal world, if all offenders or liable third parties
were held accountable for the harm done to victims and if those respon-
sible had the resources to pay, compensation programs might not even
be necessary, or at most would simply pay victims while they awaited pay-
ment from others. But the reality is somewhat different. A significant
number of perpetrators are never found. If they are, prosecutors may
fail to request restitution in criminal trials, judges often fail to order it,
court clerks and probation and parole authorities may be lax in collect-
ing it. In any event, many offenders don't, and never will have, re-
sources to pay. Similarly civil suits filed by victims or compensation
programs against offenders or third parties are relatively rare, since civil
litigation is expensive and time consuming and the outcome is
uncertain.
28 1
277 See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 13:75-1.26(b)(1) (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-
7312(b) (1992); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.52(a) (1) (Vernon 1994).
278 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-12(b) (1994). ("Acceptance of an award... shall
constitute an agreement on the part of the recipient reasonably to pursue any and all civil
remedies... against the" offender). In N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 634(1) (a) (McKinney 1994), the
Board may request V to commence an action against 0 or a responsible third party; V's
failure to do so operates as an assignment of his claim to the Board to the extent of the
compensation paid.
279 E.g., TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 56.52(b) (Vernon 1994) ("If the claimant
brings the action as trustee and recovers compensation awarded by the [Board], the claim-
ant may deduct from the benefits recovered on behalf of the state the reasonable expenses
of the suit, including attorney fees, expended in pursuing the recovery for the state.").
Compare with State of Nevada Victims of Crime Fund v. Barry, 792 P.2d 26 (Nev. 1990). By
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13966.01 (b) (Deering 1994), claimant receives a "bonus" of 25% of the
award if he or she files a civil claim within one year.
280 See NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 17.
281 CVCB HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at VIII-1. According to the NU SUMMARY, supra note
36, at 30, "program staff ... expressed frustration with the low amounts they recover in
subrogation." The British Board does not consider it worthwhile to have a power to re-
cover compensation from 0 since there are so few cases in which 0 would have sufficient
means to pay. In 1992-1993 the amount ordered to be paid by offenders by way of com-
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By way of illustration, the New York program (which has an im-
pressive array of subrogation provisions) paid out some $15 million in
compensation for personal injury and death in 1991-1992. In return,
it received $21,083 from offenders and $60,437 from civil actions
against third parties-i.e., less than one percent of the total cost of
compensation.28 2 The restitution picture is just as grim. While of-
fenders were ordered to pay just over $22 million to victims by way of
restitution in 1989, recent experience suggests that only one quarter
of this amount will actually be paid.28 3 Nonetheless, some observers
remain optimistic:
While a program should operate under no illusion that even a sustained
restitution and subrogation effort will result in a large proportion of its
awards being recovered, there are a number of states that have earned a
substantial return on their investment of personnel in this area.
284
In short, victims and their employers, either directly or indirectly
through the deduction of collateral benefits, make a substantial con-
tribution to reducing the cost of compensation; those whose crime or
tort results in compensable injury or death generally do not.
VI. FUNDING
The available data suggest that the total amount spent on crimi-
nal injuries compensation in Great Britain and in the United States
was in the region of $230 million in each country in 1992-1993.285 But
Table 5 suggests that most programs in the United States are still rela-
pensation orders represented less than 1% of the compensation paid by the Board. CRIMI-
NAL INIURIES Comp. BD., supra note 225, at 8.
282 NEw YORK STATE CRIME VIrTIMS BD. 1991-1992 ANNUAL REPORT 39 (1992). Accord-
ing to the NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 40, "funds recovered through subrogation ...
account for 0.5% of all programs' revenues." In Texas, subrogation yielded less than 1% of
program income in 1992-1993. OFICE OF THE ATr'Y GEN., supra note 50, at 8.
283 See e.g., PAMELAY. SWANIGAN, RESTITUTION IN NEwYORK STATE 16 (1991) Oust under
27% of the $92.3 million ordered in restitution payments in 1985-1989 had been collected
by the end of 1989). See also BARBARA E. SMrrIH ET AL, IMPROVING ENFORCEMENT OF COURT-
ORDERED RESTITUTION (1989). The situation in NewJersey appears to be similar. See State
v. Newman, 623 A.2d 1355, 1362 (NJ. 1993) (in 1992, $24.2 million in restitution assessed,
$7 million collected).
284 CVCB HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at Sec. VIII (various strategies for maximizing re-
turns are summarized). Funding problems have encouraged many programs to seek ways
of improving recovery rates. See, e.g., Kelly Brodie & Alison Sotak, Restitution and Subroga-
lion, CRIME VICTIM COMB. Q., No. 2, 1993, at 9 (detailing how "aggressive" recovery efforts
have "more than doubled" recoveries to "nearly 15%" of compensation payments in Iowa);
Curt Soderlund &Jody Patel, Maximizing Offender Revenue, CRIME VICTIM CoMp. Q. No. 3,
1993, at 9 (details initiatives taken in California).
285 In Great Britain, total compensation of £152.2 million (or $228.3 million if
£1=$1.50) was paid in 1992-1993. CRIMINAL INJURIES COMp. BD., 29TH ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 225, at 7. In the United States, total dollar amounts paid out in FY 1993 were
$232 million. Information supplied by Office for Victims of Crime (on file).
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tively modest by British standards.
TABLE 5:
COMPENSATION PROGRAM COSTS 1981 AND 1988286
1981 1988 1992 [GB]
No. of programs with total costs of -



















17.7 16.5 9.7 17.0
Indeed, without the largest programs (New York, Ohio, and California
in 1981 and California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, Texas, and
Washington in 1988),287 the average cost of the remaining thirty-five
programs in 1988 was in the region of $1.3 million, as compared with
an average ofjust under $1 million for the remaining twenty-five pro-
grams in 1981. The significance of these figures becomes more clear
with a common denominator-the amount of compensation paid per
100,000 head of population:
286 Based on McGiLLIS & SMITH, supra note 1, Exhibit 1.5, and Data for Federal Fiscal
Year 1992, as recorded in NJ. VIOLENT CRIMES COMP. BD., 1992-1993 ANNUAL REPORT
(1994) (no information available for five programs). See also, NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36,
Table 5.1 (also incomplete). The British figures are taken from CRIM. INJURIES COMP. BD.
25TH ANNUAL REPORT 1988-1989, 1989, Cmnd. 900, at 8 (£l=$1.50).
287 Unfortunately, the NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, does not have a figure for Ohio. In
1991-1992, the total compensation paid in Ohio was $11 million. CT. OF CL. O OHIO,
ANNUAL REPORT 11 (1992). Without the same six states as in 1988, the average (40%)
VOCA grant in FY 1992 was $0.58 million. 1994 VOCA REPORT, supra note 8, at 82-83. This
suggests that the other 38 states paid on average some $1.45 million in compensation in
1990. California remains the most expensive program with expenditure on compensation
of $15.2 million in 1981-1982, $38.5 million in 1987-1988, and $81.7 million in 1991-1992.
1990-1992 CAL. STATE BD. OF CONTROL, BIENNIAL REPORT 27 (1993).
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Table 6: CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION PER 100,000 HEAD OF
POPULATION 1990288
VIOLENT
CRIME PER COMP.($M) $ COMP. PER
POP.(M) 100,000 (TOTAL) 100,000
United States
All 248.7 732 143.7 58,000
California 29.8 1045 48.8 164,000
New York 18.0 1181 7.2 40,000
Texas 17.0 761 15.1 89,000
Florida 12.9 1244 4.6 36,000
Pennsylvania 11.9 431 2.0 17,000
Illinois 11.4 967 3.0 26,000
Ohio 10.8 506 7.1 66,000
Others 136.9 - 55.9 41,000
Great Britain 55.5 494 109.1 197,000
It is noticeable that the level of compensation does not appear to de-
pend on the size of the population or on the incidence of violent
crime.28 9 Only the California program compares favorably with the
level of compensation paid by the British Scheme.
The programs in operation in 1981 were funded by money raised
entirely within the state. Since 1986, however, funding has increas-
ingly been available from money raised at the federal level under the
Victims of Crime Act 1984 (as amended). As Table 7 suggests, the
bulk of these funds is now raised from contributions made by persons
convicted of criminal offenses. This is in stark contrast to the British
Scheme, which has, since its inception, been funded entirely by a
grant from general tax revenues.
2 90
288 United States: derived from CAL STATE BD. OF CONTROL, supra note 287, at 37;
UNITED STATES DEP'T OFJUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1990, Table 4 (1991). Great
Britain: CRIMINAL STATISTICS: ENGLAND AND WALES 1992, 1993, Cmnd. 2410, Table 2.3 and
CRIM. INJURIES COMP. BD., 26TH ANNUAL REPORT, 1990, Cmnd. 1365, at 7.
289 Contra David C. Nice, State Programs for Crime Victims, 17 POL'Y STUr. J. 25, 36 (1988)
("[E]xtensive public action programs [for victims] tend to be found in more metropolitan
and densely populated states and in states with higher crime rates and more liberal
electorates.").
290 BRITISH SCHEME, supra note 10, 2 (no other source of funding has been seriously
considered). For a discussion of American funding theories, see Sveinn A. Thorvaldson &
Mark R. Krasnick, On Recovering Compensation Funds from Offenders, 5 VICrIMoLoG 18, 21-27
(1980).
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Table 7: COMPENSATION PROGRAMS: SOURCES OF INCOME2 9 1
1988 1993
Amount % Amount %
General revenue $35.5m 21.7 $32.4m 11.3
Fines/penalties $101.1 61.7 $159.6 55.7
VOCA grants $24.9 15.2 $69.1 24.1
Other $2.5 1.5 $25.2 8.8
Total $164.0 $286.3
A. STATE FUNDING
Table 8 suggests that in two-fifths of the programs, general reve-
nue provides all or part of the "state" element of funding. This repre-
sents a decrease (both relatively and absolutely) since 1988, when it
appears that one-half of the programs were funded in this way.29 2 Fur-
ther, Table 7 shows that income from general revenue has decreased
from 25% to 15% of total state funding during this period. Although a
grant from the general revenue raised from taxpayers is a more satis-
factory theoretical basis for the public provision of compensation funds
for victims of crimes of violence, the practical difficulty of securing
adequate funds from legislatures under increasing fiscal and financial
pressures appear to have led new programs to prefer what is in effect a
tax on those convicted of criminal offenses.
Table 8: COMPENSATION PROGRAMS BY TYPE OF FUNDING
2 93
1988 1994
General revenue 12 9
Mixed 7 12
Offender fines/penalties 19 31
Total 38 52
291 1988: NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 38; 1993: information supplied by Office for
Victims of Crime (on file). The NU survey covered only 38 programs, and may have
understated the significance of "fines and penalties" as the major source of funds, since
most of the missing programs appear to have come into this category. The CVCQ survey
covered all 52 programs.
292 According to McGILLIS & SMrrH, supra note 1, Exhibit 6.5, there were 13 "general
revenue" and 8 "mixed" programs out of a total of 33 programs (i.e., approximately two-
thirds) in 1981. NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 5, commented that "[w]hile historical data
are lacking, program directors believe that continuing state fiscal crises have caused legisla-
tures to rely less on appropriations and more on 'abuser taxes'-fines and penalties-to
fund victim compensation programs." Id.
293 NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 38; Note, Program Funding, CRIME VICTIM COMP. Q.,
1994, No. 1 at 12. "General revenue" means that the program derives no (state) funds
from fines and penalties, though some funding may come from other sources. A program
is "mixed" if it is funded by general revenue, fines and penalties and other sources. If a
program received no funding from general revenue, it is classified as "fines and penalties"
(though it may also receive some contributions from other sources).
COMPENSATION OF CRIME VICTIMS
This "tax" can take one-or both-of two forms. The first is a
relatively small, additional court fee charged in all criminal and quasi-
criminal proceedings. 294 The second is a "penalty fine" (which may
be substantial) levied on those convicted of almost any criminal of-
fense.29 5 The constitutionality of this method of funding compensa-
tion programs was upheld in State v. Champe,296 where a defendant
convicted of shoplifting and reckless driving was fined $300 and or-
dered to pay a five percent surcharge ($15) into the criminal injuries
compensation fund. The court considered, inter alia, that the
surcharge provision benefitted the general public by "shift[ing] a fi-
nancial burden that would otherwise fall on all Florida taxpayers."
Although the defendant had not committed a crime of violence, "[i] t
is not irrational for the legislatures... to combine all lawbreakers for
the purpose of remedying the consequences of violent crime." Such a
surcharge would only be invalid if it were so excessive or harsh that it
was "plainly and undoubtedly in excess of any reasonable require-
ments for redressing the wrong."
Michigan provides a copybook example of this approach. 29 7 In
1988, following a referendum, Michigan adopted a constitutional
amendment which set out the rights of crime victims. It declared that
"the legislature may provide for an assessment against convicted de-
fendants to pay for crime victims' rights." 2 98 A Criminal Assessments
Commission was appointed to report annually on the costs and reve-
nues from such assessment and on the adequacy of those funds. In its
1991 Report, the Commission indicated that "[a]ppropriate assess-
ment amounts are those that are equitably shared by all criminal de-
fendants... [and] are not so great... that they preclude a convicted
defendant's ability to pay."299 The assessments should also "demon-
294 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.20 (West 1993) ($20 fee (raised to $50 in 1992) im-
posed on any defendant pleading guilty or convicted of a felony, misdemeanor, traffic
offense or violation of municipal or county ordinance).
295 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-23-17 (1993), as applied inJackson v. State, 594 So. 2d 1289
(Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (D convicted on one count of kidnapping, and one count of rape,
sentenced to life imprisonment, ordered to pay $740 restitution to V and $10,000 to crime
victims compensation fund). According to CAL GOV'T CODE § 13967(a) (Deering 1994),
the court, when setting the fine (of up to $10,000) "shall consider any relevant factors,
including... the seriousness and gravity of the offense and the circumstances of its com-
mission, any economic gain derived by the defendant as a result of the crime, and the
extent to which others suffered losses as a result of the crime." Id.
296 373 So. 2d 874, 878 (Fla. 1978). The court struck down a portion of the legislation
that permitted such a surcharge to be imposed on those required to pay "civil" fines. Id. at
879.
297 See CRIMINAL ASSESSMENTS COMM'N OF MICH., REPORT ON CRIME VICrIMS RIGHTS, SERV-
ICES AND REVENUES (1991).
298 MICH. CONST., art. 1, § 24(3).
299 CRIMINAL ASSESSMENTS COMM'N OF MICH., supra note 297, at 8. The Commission,
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strate a relationship to the seriousness of the assessable offense" and,
in aggregate, "adequately support crime victim rights to services.
3 0
0
The supreme example of this funding method is California's pro-
gram, which raised almost $54 million in 1991-1992. -o Over three
quarters (77.8%) of that money came from a special $10 penalty
which judges were required to assess on each $10 in fines, penalties,
or forfeitures imposed on those convicted of various misdemeanors.
The compensation fund received $2.20 of each $10 penalty. If a de-
fendant was convicted of a felony, the judge could impose a "restitu-
tion fine" of $100 to $10,000; this source yielded 13.6% of the fund in
1991-1992. The compensation fund was also entitled to the first $20
of fines imposed on those found guilty of driving while under the in-
fluence of alcohol or controlled drugs. This yielded 6.4% of the fund.
The last two sources, which between them raised only 2.2% of the
fund, were (i) escheat of unclaimed checks, warrants, bonds, and cou-
pons (0.3%) and (ii) restitution fines levied on certain "public" of-
fenses (1.9%).
Other sources of state funding include contributions from bail
bond forfeitures30 2 and from the registration fee for lawfully held fire-
arms,303 payments from the earnings of prison inmates,30 4 contribu-
tions from punitive damages awards, 305 and private donations. 30 6
Since 1977, most states have followed New York's example and en-
acted "Son-of-Sam" laws which provide, in effect, that anyone who
contracts with a person convicted of a crime for the re-enactment of
accepting that "excessively high assessments would produce a level of diminishing return,"
proposed assessments of $30 per felony (rising to $100 for a second or additional offense)
and $20 per misdemeanor. Id. at 9.
300 Id.
301 The following details are taken from STATE BD. OF CONTROL OF CAL., BIENNIAL RE-
PORT 1990-1992, at 17-18 (1992). See also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13967 (Deering 1994); People
v. Broussard, 856 P.2d 1134 (Cal. 1993). The Texas scheme produced almost $20 million
in 1992-1993. OFICE OF THE Arr'y GEN., supra note 50, at 8.
302 See, e.g., MoNT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-109 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7336 (1992).
303 See, e.g., VIOLENT CRIMES CoMP. BD. OF N.J., ANNUAL REPORT 1989-1990, at 7 (1990).
304 Id. at 6.
305 A number of states have recently enacted "experimental" legislation to give the state
a share (ranging from 20-50%) of punitive damages awarded to "a private party" in a civil
action against a defendant other than the state itself. See, e.g. Note, Validity, Construction
and Application of Statutes Requiring that Percentage of Punitive Damages Awards be Paid Directly
to State or Court-Administered Fund 16 A.L.R.5th 129 (1993). In most cases, the state's share is
simply paid into general state funds. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2) (West 1993);
N.Y. Clv. PRAc. L. & R. 8701 (McKinney 1994). But at least in one case, part of the award is
earmarked for the criminal injuries compensation account. OR. REv. STAT. § 18.540(1) (c)
(Supp. 1994). However, enhancement of that account is not a reason for awarding puni-
tive damages. Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 797 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Or. 1990).
306 See, e.g., I-A. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46.1816(B) (7) (West 1994); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 21-
M:8-g(II) (1993).
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that crime, or for the expression of the offender's thoughts about the
crime, by way of a movie, TV program, book, or other method of pub-
lication, must account to the state for the proceeds of such publica-
tion. °07 This money is first held in escrow to satisfy judgments
obtained by the victims against the offender. Then, after five years,
any residue may be paid over to the criminal injurie§ compensation
fund. Although the United States Supreme Court held that the New
York law violated the First Amendment because it was too broad,308 it
recognized that a state does have a legitimate interest both in prevent-
ing wrongdoers from dissipating assets before their victims can sue,
and in compensating victims from the fruits of crime. Therefore, a
properly drafted statute should be constitutionally acceptable.30 9 In
1988, however, "'Son-of-Sam' laws produced revenue in only two states
and accounted for less that 0.1% of total program revenues
nationwide."310
B. FEDERAL FUNDING
The President's Task Force on Victims of Crime painted a gloomy
picture of the state compensation programs operative in 1982:
In many states, program availability is not advertised for fear of depleting
available resources or overtaxing a numerically inadequate staff. Victim
claims may have to wait months until sufficient fines have been collected
or until a new fiscal year begins and the budgetary fund is replenished.
Creditors are seldom patient. While waiting for funding that will eventu-
ally come, victims can be sued civilly, harassed continually, or forced to
watch their credit rating vanish. 311
307 See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 595.045(14) (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.165 (West
1993); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1991). By December 1991, the New York Board
was maintaining eight escrow accounts totalling just over $79,000. See CRIME VICTIMS BD.
OF NEw YORK, 1991-1992 ANNUAL REPORT 38 (1992). There is no equivalent legislation in
Great Britain. But see MIEmRs, supra note 10, at 327.
308 Simon & Schuster Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991). The
statute singled out income derived from an expressive activity for a burden which the state
placed on no other income and was directed only at works with a specific content. See, e.g.,
Jon Allyn Soderberg, Son of Sam Laws: A VIctim of the First Amendment, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 629 (1992). See also Sue S. Okuda, Criminal Anti-Profit Laws: Some Thoughts in Favor of
their Constitutionality, 76 CAL. L. REv. 1353 (1988); David J. Fried, Rationalizing Criminal
Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 328 (1988).
309 The New York law (and similar legislation in other states) has now been rewritten.
See N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 632-a (McKinney 1994); Lori F. Zavack, Can States Enact Constitutional
"Son-of-Sam" Laws After Simon & Schuster Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board?, 37 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 701, 723 (1993). The constitutionality of similar legislation in Florida and
Maryland was raised, but not decided, in Rolling v. State ex rel Butterworth, 630 So. 2d 635
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) and Curran v. Price, 638 A.2d 93 (Md. App. 1994).
310 NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 40.
311 TA SK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 39. In McMillan v. Crime Victims Comp.
Bd., 399 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Mich. Ct App. 1986), Beasley, P.J., commented that "the Michi-
gan program has, from the beginning, suffered from under-funding.... Often, the corn-
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The Task Force identified six possible ways, other than general reve-
nue, of funding compensation programs. These included doubling or
even tripling fines and penalties for most federal offenses, intensifying
efforts by the Department of Justice to "improve fine collection and
accounting procedures," imposing a special fee ranging from $10 to
$100 for misdemeanors and from $25 to $500 for felonies, "assessed in
addition to any fine or other penalty on all those convicted of federal
offenses," and earmarking a percentage of all federal forfeitures.
312
Not all of this money would be earmarked for compensation; rather
the Task Force had in mind a general Crime Victims' Fund which
would subsidize various victim assistance programs and policies.
Congress duly implemented this recommendation in the Victims
of Crime Act of 1984, which established a Crime Victims' Fund into
which was to be deposited:
(1) all fines collected from persons convicted of most federal
offenses; 313
(2) penalty assessments imposed on all persons convicted of a
federal offense, ranging from $5 to $125 for infractions and
misdemeanors and from $50 to $200 for felonies; 314
(3) the proceeds of appearance bonds, bail bonds and collateral
forfeited by a person released on bail who then fails to ap-
pear as required;315 and
(4) any money ordered to be paid into the fund under the fed-
eral "Son-of-Sam" law.
316
mission has seemed to decide claims with one eye on the Legislature's annual
appropriations."
312 TAsK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 44-45. It was also suggested that revenues
collected on the sale of handguns could also be diverted into the fund. Id. at 44.
313 42 U.S.C. § 10601(b) (1) (1988 & Supp. 1993). See also Criminal Fine Enforcement
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-996, 98 Stat. 3134, amended by Criminal Fines Improvements Act
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-185, § 1, 101 Stat. 1279, designed to facilitate the tracking of
offenders and to improve fines collection. It appears that these fines account for some
75% of the fund.
314 18 U.S.C. § 3013 (1988 & Supp. 1993). The assessments vary between an "individual"
defendant and "a person other than an individual." The rate of assessment on the latter is
five times higher than the former. A constitutional challenge to this provision was rejected
in United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) (since any revenue raised for the
general treasury would be incidental to the main purpose of funding compensation, the
provision was not a "Bill for raising revenue" within the meaning of the origination clause).
315 See 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1988). Bail procedures were reformed by the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976.
316 18 U.S.C. § 3681(c)(2) (1988). Such proceeds must be held in escrow for five years
to satisfy moneyjudgments, etc., made against the defendant in favor of victims. Whatever
is left after five years is released from escrow and paid into the crime victims fund. The
Department ofJustice has apparently drafted a proposed amendment to the federal "Son-
of-Sam" law in response to Simon & Schuster Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board,
502 U.S. 105 (1991); 1994 VOCA REPORT, supra note 8, at 26.
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In 1984, Congress also enacted the Criminal Fine Enforcement
Act, which increased maximum fines for federal misdemeanors and
felonies, permitted the assessment of interest and penalties on over-
due fine payments, and transferred responsibility for the collection of
fines from the courts to the United States attorneys.317 The net result
was that in the seven years prior to 1992, some $830 million was paid
into the Crime Victims' Fund.318
However, not all of the money deposited in the Fund can be used
for the victims of crime, although the "ceiling sum" allocated to crime
victims has steadily increased. By Fiscal Year 1992, when the cap was
$150 million, VOCA yielded some $69 million for criminal injuries
compensation grants in 1992-1993.3 19 In 1992, however, the fund was
"uncapped," so that in future years the amount available will (subject
to the 40% restriction mentioned below) be limited only by the size of
the overall fund.3 2
0
State compensation programs which meet the eligibility require-
ments of VOCA and the implementing guidelines receive grants of up
to 40% of the amount paid by them in compensation awards. - 21 But,
317 The maximum for misdemeanors was raised from $1000 to $100,000 for both indi-
viduals and corporations; the maximum for felonies was raised from $250,000 to $500,000,
for both types of defendants as well. NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 2. A 1992 amendment
to VOCA, which sets aside the first $6.2 million paid into the Crime Victims Fund, was
designed to help with the development of a National Fine Center to improve the collection
of fines and restitution. See CRIME VrIM COMP. Q., No. 3, 1992, at 4.
318 1994 VOCA REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.
319 Until 1992 VOCA funds were allocated as follows:
First $100m: 49.5% to compensation programs
45% to crime victim assistance programs
5.5% to other victim services
Next $10m: to other victim programs
Next $40m: 47.5% to compensation programs
47.5% to victim assistance programs
5% to other victim services
In FiscalYear 1992, the net total VOCA Fund (based on the amount collected in Fiscal Year
1991) was $127 million. This meant that $8.1 million (which is equal to 49.5% of $17
million), was available for compensation purposes. In Fiscal Year 1992, $221 million was
collected. Applying the cap of $150 million, only $69 million was available for compensa-
tion purposes in Fiscal Year 1993. Information supplied by Office for Victims of Crime.
320 The cap, which had been steadily raised from $100 million to $150 million, was abol-
ished as of Fiscal Year 1993 by the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-572, § 1001, 106 Stat. 4506, 4520 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (1988 & Supp. 1993)).
The allocation of the fund has changed slightly in recent years. As a result of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (d) (3), the first $6.2
million of the Fund will now be top-sliced for other purposes; thereafter, 48.5% will be
available for compensating victims. The amount collected in Fiscal Year 1993 (for alloca-
tion in Fiscal Year 1994), however, fell back to $145 million. CRIME VICTIM COMP. Q., No.
4, 1993, at 5.
321 More precisely, the grant is based on the compensation (other than amounts for
property damage) paid "during the preceding fiscal year." 42 U.S.C. § 10602(a) (1988).
Thus, in Fiscal Year 1994, a program qualifies for a VOCA grant of 40% of the compensa-
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although VOCA has been an important addition to the funding of
state programs, it has not eliminated funding problems: "Eighteen
programs said resources were inadequate to pay deserving claims. Al-
most half the program directors reported that funding was inadequate
to support program administration. '322 The verdict of the Office for
Victims of Crime, which has the responsibility for administering
VOCA, is clear and simple: "The need to contain program costs
presents perhaps the most formidable challenge for state program ad-
ministrators across the country.
'323
VII. THE UNMET NEED FOR COMPENSATION.
Any attempt to estimate the number of injured victims of crimes
of violence who do not obtain compensation is fraught with difficulty
and uncertainty. With respect to the British Scheme, the most recent
estimate suggests that, in 1990, the Board made full or reduced
awards of compensation from 35% to 49% of those injured by re-
corded crimes of violence in England and Wales.3 24 According to the
most recent estimate in the United States, "it appears that about 22%
of eligible victims [i.e., those victims of crimes of violence reported to
the police who were (a) killed or sufficiently severely injured to re-
quire medical attention, (b) 'innocent,' and (c) not able to recoup
their losses from collateral sources] are served by compensation pro-
tion paid to victims in Fiscal Year 1992. 1994 VOCA REPORT, supra note 8, at 13-14. If the
crime victim fund is insufficient to pay 40%, section 10602(a) (2) provides that all pro-
grams be awarded the same reduced percentage as is payable. It seems only 37% grants
were payable in 1991-1992. See CRIME ViCTIM COMP. Q., No. 3, 1992, at 4. In the future,
however, there may be a reserve (not exceeding $20 million) to meet such a contingency.
See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 10602 (b) (3),
which requires the state to certify that VOCA grants will not be used to supplant state funds
otherwise available for compensation or to cover administrative costs. But the Act does not
permit "more that 5%" of a VOCA grant to be used "for the administration of the State
crime victim compensation program."
322 NIJ SUMMARY, supra note 36, at 5. The Office for Victims of Crime has recommended
that a "floating" percentage be enacted to authorize VOCA funding in excess of 40% when-
ever possible. 1994 VOCA REPORT, supra note 8, at 27.
323 1994 VOCA REPORT, supra note 8, lists various cost-containment approaches, not nec-
essarily at the victim's expense. Thus, a number of programs have reduced the fees payable
for medical treatment, but only on the basis that the treatment provider accepts the pro-
gram's rates as payment in full for the services provided. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 13965(k) (Deering 1994).
324 MtEs, supra note 10, at 29-36. The available information suggests that "the eligible
population of those victims who have suffered injury as a result of a crime of personal
violence in England and Wales would be between 25% and 35% of the total of such re-
ported crime." In 1990, there were 249,904 reported crimes of violence, producing 62,500-
87,500 injured victims; in 1990-1991 the British Board received 43,432 claims from England
and Wales, and paid full or reduced awards to 30,345 of such claimants (i.e., 35-49% of
those injured). See CRIMINAL INJURIES COMP. BD., 27TH ANNUAL REPORT 1990-1991, 1991,
Cmnd. 1782, at 25; CRIMINAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES 1990 (1991).
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grams."325 Stated differently, less than 10% of all victims killed or in-
jured by reported crimes of violence obtained some compensation. 326
This estimate refers to 1987-1988, and recent developments indicate
that both figures would be higher today.
Viewed from another angle, the total crime victim compensation
paid in the United States in 1992 appears to have been in the region
of $230 million,3 27 whereas the "direct" economic cost of crimes of
violence to victims in that year has been estimated at $1362 million.328
Because of the admitted unreliability of both sets of estimates and
the difficulty of comparison between Great Britain and the United
States, no definitive conclusion can be drawn from these figures. Un-
til more reliable information is provided, the available data suggest
that, as compared with Great Britain, fewer (and possibly many fewer)
victims receive financial assistance from compensation programs in
the United States.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The creators of the British Scheme could find "no constitutional
or social principle" to justify state compensation for crime victims, 3 29
and academic commentators were no more successful.330 Compensa-
tion programs in the United States have experienced similar theoreti-
cal problems.3 31 Because a priori reasoning is inconclusive, it is
necessary to turn to observation and deduction. The "experiments"
325 NIJ SUMMARY, su ra note 36, at 16-17. -The authors caution: "These estimates...
should be viewed as rough approximations." Id. Cf. A study has found that about 8% of
the 45,000 persons victimized by violent crime in NewJersey in 1987 had filed compensa-
tion claims. See ALBERT R. ROBERTS, HELPING CRIME VicriMs: RESEARCH, POLICY AND PRAC-
TICE 29-30 (1990).
326 It was estimated that 632,743 violent offenses resulting in injury or death were re-
ported to the police in 1987. During Fiscal Year 1988, there were 65,799 compensation
awards, but a number of these would have been for mental health counseling of "secon-
dary" victims. Id. at 3-4, 16-17.
327 Extrapolated from figures given in 1994 VOCA REPORT, supra note 8, at 20.
328 CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1992 Appendix IV (1994). If allow-
ance is made for pain and suffering, and for the "value" of life, the total is much higher.
See Mark A. Cohen, A Note on the Cost of Crime to Victims, 27 URBAN STUD. 134 (1990) (cost of
rape, robbery, and assault estimated to total $79.1 billion).
-329 REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES OF VIO-
LENCE, 1961, Cmnd. 1406, 18.
330 See, e.g., ATIYAH, supra note 12, at 292-96; MIERS, supra note 10, at 1-8; Andrew Ash-
worth, Punishment and Compensation: Victims, Offenders and the State 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 86, 99-107 (1986). For the most recent attempt, see John Haldane and Anthony
Harvey, The Philosophy of Compensation, in REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT WORKING PArY, COM-
PENSATING THE VICTIMS OF CRIME, Appendix A (1993).
331 See especially SMITH, supra note 17, at 57; LeRoy L. Lamborn, Crime Victim Compensa-
tion: Theory and Practice in the Second Decade 1 VICTIMOLOGY 503 (1976); McGiLLis & SMITH,
supra note 1, at ch. 2, especially at 27.
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conducted over the past thirty years or so, at least when viewed by an
observer more familiar with the British Scheme, 3- 2 appear to yield the
following results:
1. Crime victims do not have an unequivocal "right" to compen-
sation from the state, in the sense that they do have a fully-
fledged right to damages from tortfeasors. Correlatively, the
state has no "duty" to provide such compensation (though it
is almost universally the case that it will do so) either in rec-
ognition of a moral or social responsibility, or for strategic
considerations linked to the maintenance of law and order,
or to attempts to improve the administration of criminal jus-
tice. The absence of a duty enables the state to limit (and in
extremis to withdraw) the provision of compensation. The im-
perfect nature of the victim's right also tends to facilitate the
refusal of compensation to "undeserving" claimants.
2. Compensation programs have four principal components,
each of which is dynamic:
(a) Qualifying offenses: Programs may focus on the nature of the
offense (whether it is a "crime of violence") or on its results
(whether it is a "criminal injury"). This distinction may
have little practical significance in itself, but treating the in-
jury rather than the crime as the focal point for designating
the compensable event encourages the recognition of a
broader concept of "victim" entitled to compensation. Re-
striction to crimes of violence is difficult to justify, but may
facilitate a broader approach to other components of the
program. Conversely, a causal approach is broader in
scope, but may for that reason tend to encourage alternative
restrictions.
(b) Recognized injurie. Two "laws" are generally established-
compensation is payable for "physical" injury and death;
compensation is not payable for damage to property or for
pure financial loss (i.e., financial loss in the absence of per-
sonal injury or death). What remains uncertain, as a result
of a conflict between principle and practice, is the extent to
which compensation is payable for "mental" suffering. In
principle, it is accepted that mental suffering (or at least
serious mental suffering) makes a person a victim of crime
just as much as physical injury. In practice, however, the
provision of compensation for such injuries is not only
fraught with difficulties of proof, but is also costly. There
332 For a recent analysis by an American observer, see Sarnoff, supra note 19, at ch. VII.
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appears to be no clear understanding or general agreement
as to where the balance between principle and practice
most appropriately lies. The recognition of "nervous shock"
and other mental and emotional suffering as "injuries"
makes it difficult to differentiate between primary and sec-
ondary victims. Such a distinction, however, may be neces-
sary for practical and funding purposes.
(c) Eligible victims. Two broad bases of eligibility exist: deserv-
ing victims receive compensation, while undeserving victims
do not receive anything. The principle that compensation
is payable only to "deserving" victims is well established,
although there is some uncertainty as to its proper ambit.
Victims whose (mis)conduct caused or contributed to their
injury are invariably denied (and sometimes awarded only
reduced) compensation, although there is some disagree-
ment as to how far "contributory" conduct extends. Like-
wise, a victim who fails to cooperate with law enforcement
and other relevant authorities is generally ineligible. But
the notion that compensation funds should be based on fi-
nancial need and not be expended on "financially sound"
victims has lost support in principle and is largely rejected
in practice. Victims guilty of non-contributory
(mis) conduct (i.e., criminal or other conduct which neither
causes nor contributes to their injuries) generally qualify for
compensation as a matter of principle, although there may
be some tendency to deny them compensation in practice.
A more recent phenomenon is that, in recognition of the
undoubted fact that different classes of eligible victims have
special characteristics and particular needs, compensation
programs have become less monolithic. Some special con-
sideration can now be found for the elderly, children, vic-
tims of sexual offenses, victims of domestic violence, the
close family of homicide victims and of the victims of sexual
offenses. In other words, those eligible for compensation
are no longer being treated as belonging to a single undif-
ferentiated class of victims.
(d) Nature of Compensation: The compensation payable to an eli-
gible victim is not the "full" compensation of tort damages,
but "basic" financial assistance to reimburse (or in some
cases merely to offset) direct financial losses and expenses
incurred by that victim which have not been recouped from
other sources. In other words, states do not regard them-
selves as stepping directly into the shoes of the tortfeasor.
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Attempts have, however, been made to assert the primary
nature of the offender's (and tortfeasor's) responsibility for
the victim's plight, but these have met with limited success.
"Basic" compensation nonetheless enables many less seri-
ously injured victims to recoup net financial outlay. Its limi-
tations are most keenly felt by those who have sustained
severe injuries. Despite universal agreement that compen-
sation programs are "secondary," less has been done than
might have been expected to secure coordination of the
various resources available to victims.
3. Although generally described as providing "public" or "state"
compensation to crime victims, programs have from the out-
set been funded to a large extent not by public revenue (i.e.,
by taxpayers), but by "fines" imposed on persons convicted of
criminal offenses. Reliance upon this source appears to be
steadily increasing. This approach reinforces the notion that
the state has no "duty" to compensate victims and encourages
the view that victims are entitled to financial assistance deter-
mined by the availability of funds, rather than compensation
according to their needs or loss.
4. The provision of financial assistance to victims has generally
not been closely linked in practice to the general provision of
victim services. Although a Board may be charged with the
responsibility not only of determining claims for compensa-
tion, but also of providing a general victim assistance pro-
gram and conducting inquiries into the needs of victims, it
appears that, in practice, compensation remains a separate
"service"-possibly in view of its "legal," as opposed to "ad-
ministrative," nature. Greater integration with other victim
services might be desirable in principle, but it could further
reduce the "right" to compensation in practice.
5. Although compensation programs involve the collection and
allocation of considerable sums of money and are of great
practical and political interest to victims' organizations, they
tend to operate with low legal visibility. Relatively few claims
come before the courts, and comparatively few board deci-
sions are "reported" in annual reports. After an initial flurry
of activity, there has been relatively little interest among
scholars in the continuing development and operation of
compensation programs.
6. Compensation programs have come a long way since 1965,
but they may be facing a crisis of confidence. The rise in the
rate of violent crimes means that the number of crime victims
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continues to increase. Real developments and political rheto-
ric over the past decade or so have created greater expecta-
tions of assistance, both financial and otherwise, among those
victims. Compensation programs have become, or at least
have shown the way to become, more sophisticated and re-
sponsive to victims' needs. But those same programs are be-
ginning to reflect the pressures imposed by a lack of secure
and adequate funding. Hopefully, the somewhat indetermi-
nate status of programs providing compensation for the vic-
tims of crime, which may in the past have assisted their
development, will not now prove to be their undoing.
